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The Southern Philippines secessionist movement has developed once 
again into a major security concern of the Republic of the Philippines. The 
hostilities have taken a heavy toll on the nation’s human and physical resources 
and have hurt the nation’s economy. Likewise, the rebellion has afflicted both 
regional and global security because of the reported linkages of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf with the Islamic militant groups. The United 
States has already directly intervened in the Philippine counter-terrorism 
campaign by providing military assistance and deploying American combat 
troops in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. 
Peace remains elusive. Various administrations have used combinations 
of military, political, diplomatic and socio-economic instruments to resolve the 
conflict but the violence persists. The presidential regime of Fidel Ramos 
appeared to have achieved a breakthrough in finding a lasting solution by 
assiduously instituting the policies of decentralization and regional autonomy. 
Although the government has settled the dispute with the MNLF, other equally 
dangerous groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf 
have emerged espousing independence from the Republic of the Philippines.  
This thesis will analyze the issues and prospects surrounding the Muslim 
secessionist movements in the Philippines and will examine the responses to 
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The Southern Philippine secessionist movement has escalated once again 
into a major security concern of the Republic of the Philippines. The hostilities 
have exacted a heavy toll on the nation’s human and physical resources and 
have brought adverse consequences to the nation’s economy. In addition, the 
rebellion has afflicted both regional and global security because of the links to the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group with international 
terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda. The United States has already directly 
intervened to assist the Philippine counter-terrorism campaign by sending 
American troops and providing military aid.   
The conflict in Mindanao is the result of several factors: historical 
politicization of Moro identity, general underdevelopment of the area, unequal 
wealth distribution and the inadequate effort of the Manila government to 
integrate the Moros into the political and institutional fabric of the nation. The 
wealth of the region has provided a strong incentive to both the government and 
the Moros to continue the armed struggle, which started in the late 1960s. 
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis will attempt to determine and analyze the drivers of violent 
conflict in Mindanao1 and formulate policies and strategies to settle the dispute. I 
will tackle the following questions: a) How did the conflict evolve and what are the 
underlying causes of the conflict? b) What are the underlying effects and 
consequences of the Spanish and American colonialization? c) How did the 
Philippine central government respond to each stage of the conflict? d) Why does 
the fighting continue even though the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
brokered the Peace Agreement in 1996 between the Government of the Republic 
                                            
1 The Philippines consists of 7107 islands in Southeast Asia, with only 2000 of them inhabited. To its 
north is Taiwan, while on its Southwest is Eastern Malaysia and Brunei, and Indonesia is to its south. The 
two principal islands of the Luzon are Luzon in the north, occupying 40,420 square miles (104,688 square 
kilometers), and Mindanao in the south, occupying 36,537 square miles (94,630 square kilometers). 
Together, Luzon and Mindanao account for 65% of the land mass. The Archipelago’s land area is 115,860 
square miles (300,076 square kilometers).  
1 
of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)? e) What 
policies and strategies should be undertaken by the government to escape the 
conflict trap? 
I will review the history of the Muslim Filipinos within the contextual 
framework of events that politicized and radicalized the Moro identity and which 
led to the violent conflict. I will examine the factors leading to the 1996 peace 
agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) 
and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its eventual collapse. 
Specifically, this paper will identify the root of the conflict and determine the 
various factors for the continuing civil war in the Philippines.  
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT 
The Muslim Filipinos are the most dominant among the cultural minorities 
in Philippine society. They comprise about five percent of the nation’s population. 
They mostly live on the southern islands of Mindanao and Sulu2. They are an 
ethnic and religious community. As a people, their history is marked by a hostility 
towards the colonial or the central Philippine government. This has brought the 
Moros into conflict with the latter for the last three hundred years.3 They are 
united by a common religious belief, Islam, but the Moros speak multiple 
languages or dialects.  Mindanao today, as it was in the 16th century, is a land in 
violent conflict. Unlike the Muslim struggle during the colonial era, today’s 
movements against the Philippine government are better organized under the 
banners of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), and the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group. 
                                            
2 Present day Mindanao consists of 25 provinces, as follows, in alphabetical order: Agusan del Norte, 
Agusan del Sur, Basilan, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Compostela Valley, Cotabato, Maguindanao, South 
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao, Davao Oriental, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, Misamis 
Occidental, Misamis Oriental, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, 
Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay Sarangani 
3 Cesar Adib Majul, “Ethnicity and Islam in the Philippines,” in eds., Remo Guidieri et. al, Ethnicities and 
Nations: Processes of Interethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific 
(Houston:Rothko Chapel, 1988), 362. 
2 
The root causes of the strife in the Southern Philippines, or Mindanao, 
began as an ethnic problem associated with state building.4 This internecine 
conflict can be traced back to the Spanish and American colonial periods, when 
the Moros resisted subjugation, intrusion into their lands, and the destruction of 
their communities.5 For over three centuries (1565-1898), Spain attempted to 
incorporate Mindanao into what would have become a Christian Philippine 
colony. In the 16th century, armed with the sword and cross, Spanish influence in 
the country resulted in the massive conversion of natives in Luzon and the 
Visayas and the new converts fought as proxies in the Spaniard’s war against the 
Muslims. Due to the failure of Spain to colonize Mindanao, the Southern 
Philippines was not transformed. However, the Muslims gained a foothold in the 
Philippine socio-political system.6 In the succeeding period, the Philippines was 
ceded to the United States under the 1898 treaty of Paris and the American 
pacification campaign succeeded in neutralizing the Moro resistance by placing 
Mindanao under direct military rule for about a decade (1899 - 1913) while the 
rest of the country was administered by the civilian government.7 The Americans 
successfully crushed Moro armed resistance by 1913 and then embarked on a 
series of resettlement programs that led to the migration of Christina settlers.8 
During the Commonwealth era, thousands of Christian Filipinos from the northern 
part of the country were encouraged to migrate to Mindanao, which was viewed 
as the “land of promise.” When the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the 
Philippine government, under Filipino leadership, continued these colonial 
policies and programs.9 Accordingly, most Moros could not identify themselves 
                                            
4 Federico V. Magdalena, “The Peace Process in Mindanao: Problems and Prospects,” The Southeast 
Asian Affairs, 1997, 245-259. 
5 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the 
Southern Philippines,” Asian Survey, Volume 41, Number 2, March-April 2001, 271-289. 
6 Magdalena, 246. 
7 Ibid., 246. 
8 Mirriam Coronel Ferrer, “Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia’s Societies,” Singapore: Institute 
of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, May 2001, 4. 
9 Merliza M. Makinano and Alfredo Lubang, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: The 
Mindanao Experience,” Prepared for the International Security Research and Outreach Programme 
International Security Bureau, February 2001, 8. 
3 
with the new republic because the laws were biased towards Catholic moral 
values and the educational system was geared towards Westernization. The 
resentment further deepened with the continued influx of Christian settlers into 
the Muslim territories, which has significantly transformed the demographic 
picture of Mindanao completely. The Muslim inhabitants were reduced from 
about 75 percent at the turn of the century to about 25 percent in the late 1960s10 
and less than 19 percent in 1990.11  
The colonial rule and the accompanying demographic transformation also 
resulted in the inequitable distribution of resources. In addition, the Muslims have 
felt greatly discontented by the failure of government to adequately provide the 
basic needs of their community. Muslim areas are among the most impoverished 
communities in the Philippines12 and the social indicators (health, education) are 
among the lowest in the country.13 
After a long restive co-existence between the Christian and Muslims, 
Mindanao was agitated following the 1968 Jabidah massacre when 28 Moro 
army recruits were killed at a secret training camp on the island of Corregidor 
allegedly while undergoing training to infiltrate the Malaysian state of Sabah. This 
incident triggered widespread Muslim indignation. Following this incident, 
Governor Udtog Matalam of the Cotabato province organized and led the 
Mindanao Independent Movement (MIM) and hundreds of young members of 
MIM underwent military training in Malaysia. This group became the nucleus of 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MILF). The movement obtained popular 
support after violence broke out in Cotabato and in nearby areas in 1969-1971 in 
retaliation for the declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand Marcos 
                                            
10 Macapado A. Muslim and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, “Mindanao: Land of Promise,” Accord No. 6 (1999), 
13, available at [http://www.c-r.org/accord/min/accord6/muslim.shtml]; accessed 14 November 2003. 
11 In 1913, the estimated population of Mindanao was the following: 324,816 Moros; 193,882 non-
Moros. The Moro people constituted a 76% majority. Twenty-six years later, in 1939, the Moro population 
was only 34% of the total Mindanao population; of 14,269,45; see Jubair, pp. 130-131, using 1990 Census 
of Population and Housing. 
12 Two predominantly Muslim provinces, Sulu and Maguindanao, are the poorest in the entire country, 
and the three other predominantly Muslim provinces – Basilan, Lanao del Sur, and Tawi-Tawi – are also 
listed among the poorest. 
13 Quimpo, 275. 
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in 1972.14 In the early 1970s, the problem escalated into a violent confrontation 
with the MNLF and the Philippine Government, which continued sporadically for 
more than two decades. Since then, Moros and Christian Filipinos have been 
embroiled in the politics of secession and assimilation. 
In 1976, under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
the Philippine government and the MNLF signed an agreement in Tripoli 
providing for Moro autonomy in the Southern Philippines, but it was not until 1990 
that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)15 was granted partial 
autonomy. Muslim grievances persisted, and unrest and violence continued 
through the 1990s. 
On 2 September 1996, the MNLF and the Philippine Government signed 
an internationally brokered peace agreement but this did not end the war 
because two splinter rebel groups, MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 
opposed to this peace agreement. The MILF and ASG vowed to establish an 
Islamic state in Mindanao with Islamic law (shariah). Following the referendum in 
East Timor, the MILF have engaged in on and off negotiations with the Philippine 
government. Meanwhile, the ASG engaged in kidnapping and high profile attacks 
on civilian targets triggering major military actions in late 2000-2003 which 
prompted the United States to extend its global war on terrorism to the 
Philippines.16  
The Peace talks with the MILF have been stalled since 2001, but most 
recently, the Philippine Government and the MILF agreed to resume formal 
peace negotiations on 15 October 2003 in Malaysia.17 There are brighter  
                                            
14 John Gershman, “Self-Determination Regional Conflict Profile: Moros in the Philippines,” Foreign 
Policy in Focus - Self-Determination - Regional Overview, revised October 2001; available at 
fpif.org/selfdetermination/ conflicts/philippines_body.html; accessed 14 November 2003. 
15 Consists of the Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Basilan and Marawi City.  
16 Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall, “Peace and Conflict 2003:A Global Survey of Armed 
Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy,” The University of Maryland's Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), 11 February 2003 and 01 January 2001, 23: 
available at [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC01Web.pdf]; accessed 14 November 2003. 
17 “Gov’t, MILF agree to resume peace talks in October,” Manila Bulletin, 8 September 2003. 
5 
prospects for the resolution of the conflict with the offer by United Nations 
Secretary Kofi Annan to help the Philippine government in its peace initiatives 
with the MILF.  
D. METHODOLOGY AND RESOURCES 
The thesis will concentrate on three main questions: 1) What are the 
causes of the conflict? 2) Why does the violent conflict continue despite the 1996 
peace agreement between the MNLF and GRP? 3) What are the policy and 
strategy options to settle the conflict?  
Basically, I will examine and identify the sources of grievances 
commencing from the colonialization period to the current Macapagal 
administration. Using a conflict analysis framework, I will identify the variables 
that drive the conflict and determine its root causes. I will then evaluate and 
assess campaigns initiated by each administration under the Philippine Republic 
to determine their level of success and failure in resolving and addressing the 
conflict. I will analyze and evaluate the strengths and deficiencies of the 1996 
peace agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Republic of 
the Philippines which many believe will end the dispute. Having identified the 
variables propelling the conflict, I will propose policy and strategy options to be 
undertaken by the Philippine government to mitigate if not totally end the dispute.  
I will discuss the costs and benefits on the power redistribution of actors 
relative to the conflict resolution strategy. In this regard, the main argument 
underlying the conflict resolutions in Mindanao is the degree of political autonomy 
that could be arranged which is acceptable and beneficial to both warring parties. 
Many politicians and scholars advocate a federal system of government for the 
country, but the opposition believes that full autonomy will further divide the 
segmented society. The rebels, on the other hand, insist on the full 
implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, at the minimum, and espouse the 
establishment of an Islamic state. These proposals have been the core of the 
controversies and have been rejected by the Christian inhabitants of Mindanao 
who compose 75% of the island’s population. 
 
6 
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To provide the readers an adequate understanding of the security problem 
in the Southern Philippines, this paper is organized into the following chapters. 
Chapter II is the literature overview. The chapter is a comprehensive 
review of the available literature including published works and research of 
scholars and other written articles on the Theory of Conflict Revolution, and 
those relating to the Southern Philippines. The chapter will analyze the various 
theories and models on conflict revolution and their relevance to the setting of the 
conflict in the Southern Philippines. The applicable policy option and strategy to 
end the conflict shall be derived from the applicable model or theory, or 
combination theory.  
Chapter III provides a deeper understanding of the problem by presenting 
the historical factors that shaped the Moro grievances starting from the arrival of 
Islam in the Philippines until the early years of the new Republic. It reviews the 
various programs undertaken by the previous colonial regimes, as well as the 
administrations under the Republic. In particular, I will investigate the effects of 
the integration and assimilation campaigns of the Muslim community into the 
Philippine society. I will cite incidents from the Moro wars and illustrate how the 
military campaigns in the colonial period brought harmful imprints into the 
Philippine polity.  
Chapter IV analyzes the various variables that led to the contemporary 
violent conflict in the Southern Philippines. I will discuss the development of the 
different Muslim secessionist movements in the era of the Philippine Republic. 
The effect of the external support from the Organization of Islamic Conference 
and shall likewise be examined. 
Chapter V evaluates the various counter-secessionist campaigns from the 
Marcos administration to the Macapagal regime. In particular, I will examine the 
political, socio-economic and cultural reforms launched to resolve the conflict. It 
will identify and analyze the various policies and strategies implemented by 
different regimes from 1965 to present. In this chapter, I will discuss the current 
7 
activities of the new separatist groups, and analyze the current Philippine 
government response and programs to mitigate the conflict  
Chapter VI  summarizes the discussions and offers a cogent strategy to 
resolve the conflict.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to review articles and published works of 
scholars and researchers on the broad subjects of the causes of war and conflict, 
the theories and frameworks of conflict resolutions, the history and other written 
materials about the Southern Philippines. I will discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of various models and theories. I will examine the prevailing 
economic theories on the causes of conflict and determine their correlation and 
significance in Mindanao. I will also analyze and evaluate various post-conflict 
policies and programs with the objective of resolving the violent conflict in 
Mindanao and promoting political and economic development. 
B. CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
To end conflict, we need to analyze its causes. An understanding of the 
roots of the Muslim rebellion and the failure of the 1996 peace agreement will 
generate an understanding of the nature of the conflict in the Southern 
Philippines. This rebellion has caused untold human suffering and physical 
destruction in the Muslim and Christian communities alike. In over three decades 
of violent conflict, more than 100,000 people have been killed, about one million 
persons rendered homeless and destitute, and between 200,000 to 300,000 
Filipino Muslims have been force to seek refuge in Sabah18. In 1996, the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National 
Liberation Front negotiated an end to hostilities, but peace in the region has 
remained elusive. Two radical groups emerged after 1996 espousing extremist 
objectives, including the call for an independent Islamic state of Mindanao. 
                                            
18 Many displaced Filipinos returned home in 2002, but tens of thousands have also been uprooted in 
military operations to fight terrorism in the southern island of Mindanao, says the Global IDP Project in a new 
report. Some 90,000 villagers have been displaced in Mindanao this year while the Government and United 
States launched joint military operations in IDP News (Dec. 02), available at 
[http://www.hrea.org/lists/refugee-rights/markup/msg00213.html]; accessed 14 November 2003. 
9 
Most people argue that the grounds for ethnic and internal conflict are 
simple and straightforward19. That is, the key driver for violent conflict in 
Mindanao is the hatred between Christians and Muslims. Although religion 
provided the backdrop for the conflict in Mindanao, I contend it is not the real 
driver of conflict.  
Michael E. Brown in his work, Ethnic and Internal Conflict: Causes and 
Implications, identifies the four underlying causes why certain settings are more 
prone to violence than others. These factors are: structural factors, political 
factors, economic/social factors and cultural perceptions.20 He argues that under 
economic/social factors, the potential sources of ethnic and internal conflict could 
be any or a combination of the following: economic problems, discriminatory 
economic systems, and the trials and tribulations of economic development and 
modernization. Brown further argues that the steps undertaken by the elite 
determine the direction of a political conflict on whether to pursue a peaceful or 
violent approach for resolution. Correlatively, two very vital ingredients extremely 
appealing to the masses to rebel are: the presence of antagonistic histories and 
mounting economic problems. 
Collier, on the other hand, identifies three conditions that could predict the 
likelihood of civil war: dependence upon primary commodity exports, low average 
incomes and slow growth.21 Further, he also believes that history is an important 
factor in determining the risk of war, although in a different context. He concludes 
that a country that has just recently undergone civil conflict has a greater 
likelihood of falling back into war. Empirical data, he cites, reveal that there is a 
40% probability that war will reoccur after the end of hostility. He advances the 
thesis that the level of literacy and population growth also matters in determining 
the risk of war. Collier also points out that ethnic and religious composition are 
                                            
19 Michael E. Brown, “Ethic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and Implications,” in ed. Chester A. Crocker, 
Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Turbulent Peace the Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 
(Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace Press) 2001, 211. 
20 Ibid., 209-226 
21 Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” World Bank, June 
15, 2000, 1-23; available at [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/ papers/civilconflict.htm]; accessed 
14 November 2003. 
10 
relevant in predicting conflict. In particular, he elaborates that, “if there is one 
dominant ethnic group which constitutes between 45% and 90% of the 
population, - enough to give it control, but not enough to make discrimination 
against a minority pointless- the risk of conflict doubles.” Objective grievances 
and hatreds originating from inequality, political repression, and ethnic and 
religious divisions could not possibly trigger violent conflict. Moreover, he claims 
that post-conflict societies’ chances of conflict reoccurring are high, because of 
the legacy of induced polarizing grievance.  
As popularly perceived, civil war is an acute political battle, propelled by 
grievances, which are so intense to have destroyed normal political channels. 
Thus, common understanding is that rebellion is the apex of the protest 
movements, their leaders and cadres possessing the noble virtue of self-
sacrificing heroes and martyrs fighting for oppression. Collier says that most 
rebellions are not endowed with the nationalistic and heroic fervor. According to 
him, when the major grievances – inequality, political expression, and ethnic and 
religious discords – are gauged objectively, they cannot predict the likelihood of a 
rebellion. These objective grievances and hatred may induce intense political 
conflict but such conflict may not be heightened into war. On the hand, the 
economic factors – dependence on primary commodity exports, low average 
incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas-are all excellent and powerful 
predictors of civil war.  
Collier et. al attempted to establish whether wars are fueled by greed or 
grievances, which they seem to equate with economic against political aspects. 
Collier and Hoeffler identified three objective grievances: inter-group hatred, 
political exclusion and vengeance. They categorized the three grievances by 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization; democracy, ethnic dominance, income and land 
inequalities; and the period of conflict respectively. According to Brinkman, these 
earlier models are quite simplistic and derogate the complexities of conflict and 
the different elements that cause, propel, prolong and end the conflict. He argues 
11 
that the later model of Collier and Hoeffler22 is somewhat more developed as 
they analyze some interactions and feedback mechanisms among the various 
factors. Moreover, Paul Collier also cites that the costs of rebellion are 
associated with the opportunity cost of the rebel labor and the economic 
damages caused by war. The geographical economic disparity is a logical 
ground for the rebels to ask for separation. 
Collier and associates claim that insurgency is instigated by a combination 
of altruistic desire to correct the grievances of a group, and a selfish desire to loot 
the resources of the other. The objective of rebellion is rational as rebels 
balanced the benefit and cost of the rebellion. Their study tested whether selfless 
motivation may be covered by greed, or alternatively, whether looting may only 
be a crucial means by which altruistic motives are supported. They concluded the 
two motives for rebellion are empirically evident because looting-rebellions are 
influenced by the endowment of lootable resources, while justice-seeking 
rebellions are influenced by grievances. However, the risk of conflict will not 
increase by the intensity of objective grievances.  They claim that justice-seeking 
rebellions seem to be affected by the difficulty of overcoming collective action. 
The risk of conflict is drastically diminished if the collective action is reduced, 
although grievances increased.23 
The common argument about civil conflict is that that they are irrational, 
but S. Mansoob Murshed asserts that conflict is the consequence of a rational 
decision, “even if it is only of a bounded or myopic rational choice-choice 
variety.”24 Conflict is created by any or a combination of factors such as ethnicity, 
religion, region or social class. The triggering elements for violent conflict are 
competition over economic opportunities and political and civil rights. The 
                                            
22 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievances in Civil War,” Policy Research Working 
Paper, no 2355, Washington D.C., The World Bank, May 2000; available at 
[http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greed.htm]; accessed 14 November 2003. 
23 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Justice-seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War,” Draft: 17 February 
1999, 15 available at [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/paulnew2.pdf]; accessed 14 
November 2003. 
24 S. Mansoob Murshed, “Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction,” Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2002, 387-393, 
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genuine grievances25 generating violent conflict could be traced from the 
“systematic economic discrimination against groups based on ethno-linguistic or 
religious differences, he explains.” Likewise, Murshed argues that ethnic 
identification provides security and support whenever government fails to deliver 
public goods such as economic and social services. The struggle over the 
possession of land is a condition for violence. Murshed maintains that although 
there is an array of grievances, violent strife could be restrained if there is a 
viable and effective social contract. Nations experiencing violent conflict have 
weak social contracts. “A single ethnic group (or a subset) often assumed power 
in the immediate post independence era (the 1960s), subjugating others and 
concentrating the fruits of state power - public employment, other public spending 
and resource rents - into its own hands, ”26 he opines. Likewise, he recognizes 
the critical role played by external countries in conflict. 
In his investigation, Nadir A. L. Mohammed, found that 75 percent of the 
least developed countries in the world have waged major civil wars.27 He lists 
several notable economic causes responsible for the likelihood of the occurrence 
of civil wars as follows: “sluggish economic growth, increased poverty and 
skewed income distribution, lack of basic infrastructure and social services, wide 
regional differences, lack of access to agricultural land, and depletion of natural 
resources. Paraphrasing Homer-Dixon, he states that the struggle over limited 
natural resources and environmental stress generate adverse social effects 
namely, a decrease in economic output, changes in agricultural output, 
displacement of the population, and a breakdown of the institution and disruption 
of the patterns of social behavior. These conditions breed three categories of 
conflict i.e., frustration, group identity and structural conflicts. He affirms that civil 
wars result in an economic decline with tremendous social costs and traumas as 
of the environment. Most obvious is the extravagant well as severe destruction                                             
25 Paul Collier & Anke Hoefler distinguish grievance as a motivation based on a sense of injustice and 
greed as acquisitive desire, in their article entitled “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank, 2001. 
26 Murshed, 390. 
27 Nadir A. L. Mohammed, “Civil Wars and Military Expenditures: A Note,” World Bank, Washington 
D.C., 1999, 1-22; available at [http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civil.pdf]; accessed 14 
November 2003. 
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waste of precious human and material resources. Civil wars also reduce the 
state’s capacity to provide social services because of the “crowding effect” of war 
spending. Economic activities are hampered in areas of combat. Violent conflict 
damages the infrastructure and other physical capital, consequently reducing the 
level of production if not halting it altogether. The labor supply dwindles in 
combat areas, and consequently, income dwindles. Paraphrasing the work of 
Collier, he cites that during the period of violent conflict, the GDP per capita 
recedes at 2.2 % annually.28 Collier, (1997) examines the effects of ethnic 
diversity on economic performance and the risk of violent conflict. There appears 
to be a relationship between ethnic diversity and the risk of violent conflict. 
Diversity tends to adversely affect economic performance. Highly diverse 
societies appear to be more secure than homogeneous countries, if the diverse 
societies are democratic. Overall economic growth is not dependent on the 
diversity of the society but on the political climate. Democracy effectively discards 
the potentially adverse effects of ethnic diversity on economic growth, while high 
diversity makes the society even safer from violent conflict than homogeneous 
societies. Thus, both income levels and political rights are determinants of the 
likelihood of violent conflict and the escalation of war. However, Collier argues 
that once a country entered into a full conflict, the balance of the determinants 
changes. Collier concludes that, 
the persistence of conflict and the sustainability of a settlement are 
more dependent on ethnic composition and less dependent on 
income and political rights than are the initiation and escalation of 
violence. Hence, some peace settlements may need to change 
borders so as to increase (or reduce) the ethnic diversity of the 
state.29 
On the other hand, political scholars like Fearon and Laitin observe that 
the root causes of contemporary insurgencies in many countries has been ethnic 
nationalism. They claim that the risk of civil war among countries is not 
                                            
28 Paul Collier, “On Economic Consequences of Civil War,” Working Paper 97:18 Center for the Study 
of African Economies, Oxford University, June 1997. 
29 Paul Collier, “The Political Economy of Ethnicity,” Paper Prepares for the Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 20-21 April 1998, 1-22.   
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attributable to ethnic or religious characteristics but to conditions that favor 
insurgency. Specifically, they assert that the predictors of conflict are poverty and 
slow growth, financially and bureaucratically weak states including unfavorable 
geography and a large population.30  
Political scientists have emphasized the significance of inequalities in 
fueling political violence like the relative deprivation theory and of distributive 
justice. The study of inequality in whatever field is relevant in the study of conflict. 
The importance of inequalities was confirmed in studies relating to complex 
humanitarian emergencies and in several cases of violence. Particularly, 
horizontal political and socio-economic inequality between groups, tribes in the 
case of the Philippines, whether defined by region, ethnicity, class or religion, has 
been recognized as one of the significant root causes of civil war. Again, the 
difference in income, resources and access to public services and employment 
are vital variables propelling conflict.  
A sociologist like Stein asserts that the “enemy images” play a vital role in 
sustaining and intensifying conflict. He argues that in the continuing ethnic 
conflicts, interests are formed by images, and consequently cast by identity. 
Thus, when identities are threatened, conflict tends to rise. He suggests that in 
resolving conflict effectively, parties should secure identity such as mutual 
recognition coupled with political separation. Another method of securing 
identities entails creating interdependent, multi-ethnic coalitions. In both 
approaches, the keys are the senior leaders’ willingness to acknowledge, 
respect, and welcome various identities and to share political power. He 
maintains that there is a promise of such acknowledgement and accommodation 
because identities are socially constructed, and hence, open to reconstruction 
and reinterpretation over time.31 
 
                                            
30 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 75-86. 
31 Janet Gross Stein, “Images and Conflict Resolution,” in eds., Chester Croker, Fen Hampson and 
Pamela Aall, Managing Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 105. 
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C. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
Nicole Ball’s The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies32 describes 
the characteristics of post conflict societies33 and provides a model mapping out 
the peace processes. She recommends priority peace building tasks and 
stresses the significance of governance for post conflict rehabilitation and 
development and particularly good governance in the security sector. The first 
stage of the peace process is the cessation of peace, the purpose of which is to 
reach an agreement on fundamental issues, so that fighting can be stopped and 
political and socio-economic construction can begin. The next stage is peace 
building, which is composed of two stage-transitions and consolidation. The 
objectives during transition are to create a government with a sufficient degree of 
legitimacy to function effectively and to execute the provisions of the agreement. 
During the consolidation phase, she admonishes the necessity to intensify the 
reform process to enable fundamental political, economic and social grievances 
to be addressed. The fundamental component of governance is the creation of 
an institutional framework that supports equitable economic and political 
development. Some of the tasks are accountability, transparency, 
comprehensiveness, commitment to equity and the acceptance of the rule of law. 
She further suggests the disbanding and disarming of informal security forces 
and demobilization of some members of the regular forces, and at a certain level, 
the police force and the judicial system must be developed and reformed. The 
security forces should operate according to democratic principles meaning 
accepting civilian supremacy and respect of the rule of law. She concludes by 
                                            
32 Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,” in ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Turbulent Peace the Challenges of Managing International Conflict 
(Washington, D.C.: United Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 719 –736. 
33 The experience of prolonged strife produces important similarities in the nature and function of civil 
institutions and political life, the economy and the security sector in the post conflict environment. He 
summarized these characteristics in a table and he cautioned that every country that experiences violent 
inter-group conflict will not necessarily exhibits all these characteristics. He groups the characteristics of 
war-torn societies into three: institutional - weak political and administrative institutions, non-participatory 
political system, etc.; economic and social -extensive damage to or decay of economic and social 
infrastructure, conflicts over the ownership of land, environmental degradation, weakened social fabric, poor 
social indicators etc.; security – bloated security forces, armed opposition, paramilitary forces, 
overabundance of small arms, political role of security forces, history of human rights abuses perpetrated by 
security forces, etc. 
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stating that high caliber, experienced individuals are critical to the success of 
peace building. By employing the right individual, the institutional and the 
organizational deficits can be substantially overcome.34 
Roland Paris differs in opinion on the issue of democratization in peace 
conflict building. He asserts that democratization and marketization imperil the 
domestic peace of states that are surfacing from civil wars and to reduce the 
dangers, he suggests pursuing a strategy of “institutionalization before 
liberalization,” restricting political and economic freedom and political activity in 
the process of building effective institutions. Peace builders should first lay the 
groundwork for a smoother and secure transition to market economy and 
democracy and this will ultimately bring sustainable peace. He affirms that unless 
the governors assume a firmer hand in the immediate post conflict period, the 
recurrence of the conflict could be imminent.35  
Lederach urges that an infrastructure is necessary for maintaining the 
dynamic transformation of conflict and the construction of peace. That 
infrastructure is a process-structure consisting of systems that are dynamic, 
flexible and adaptable. The process-structure for peacebuilding converts a war-
system into a peace-system capable finding nonviolent mechanisms for 
expressing and handling conflict. At the societal level, the infrastructure is 
composed of a “web of people, their relationships and activities, and the social 
mechanisms necessary to sustain the change sought.” The object of the process-
structure is towards inter-dependence and reconciliation that focuses on 
redefining and restoring broken relationships. He says that peacebuilding by 
means of constructive transformation is both a visionary and context-responsive 
approach.36 
                                            
34 Ibid., 733. 
35 Wilson's Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, available in 
[http://sobek.colorado.edu/~wehr/parismay15.htm]; accessed 14 November 2003. 
36 John Paul Lederach, “Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies,” (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press), 1997. 
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Collier and Hoeffler in their earlier study conclude that previous wars had 
no major influence on the overall level of risk. Thus, they suggest that post-
conflict societies are not more of a risk simply as a result of their experience with 
civil war. They say, however, that conflicts raise the risk of further conflict by 
changing the values of their causal variables. Since civil wars shrink income, 
post-conflict countries will have a reduced opportunity cost of rebellion. 
D. THE EVIDENCE IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
Do the foregoing discussions on the causes of war relate appropriately to 
the current conflict in Mindanao? The prevailing theories appear to adequately 
explain the origin, violence, and the possible avenue for the cessation of the 
Moro conflict. An examination on the scarcity of resources, particularly land, 
supports the argument of Brown’s discriminatory economic system. Likewise, 
Bertrand asserts that the Muslim grievances could be traced back several 
centuries since the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The Muslims have been 
fighting to protect their territory and identity against a foreign power and 
domination.37 During the Commonwealth period, Mindanao was considered a 
“land of promise,” intended for resettlement, and the government program 
concentrated on its exploitation and economic development. Accordingly, the 
previous administrations encouraged Christian settlers from the Visayas and 
Luzon to migrate to Mindanao.38 “This led to the beginning of ‘legalized land 
grabbing’ in Mindanao.”39 After the country’s independence in 1946, the 
Philippine Government continued colonial policies and programs. The feelings of 
marginalization and insecurity developed among Muslims. Muslim Filipinos 
owned most of the land in Mindanao before colonization but this decreased to 30 
percent by 1972. Also, by 1982, Muslim ownership further declined to 17 percent.  
                                            
37 Jacques Bertrand, “Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement 
is Fragile,” Pacific Affairs 73:1 (Spring 2000), 43.  
38 Cesar Adib Majul, “Ethnicity and Islam in the Philippines,” in Guideri et al. (eds.) Ethnicities & 
Nations, (University of Texas Press, 1988). 
39 Syed Serjul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movement in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the 
Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, I-5 (May 1998), 441-456. 
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The frequency appears to support Murshed’s observation that immediately after 
independence, the majority group assumes power and concentrates the fruit of 
state power into their hands. 
Much has been published about the root causes of the Muslim 
secessionist movement, the motivations, the scope and problems accompanying 
the struggle. Noble states that the Muslim separatism had centuries old historical 
roots, but was also propelled by a specific grievance accumulated during the 
1960’s40. She affirms that the northern influx to Mindanao influenced all sectors 
of society because it disturbed both the traditional socio-economic patterns and 
the political system that reflected and perpetuated them.  
On the other hand, Joel de los Santos lists the various causes 
encompassing political, socio-economic and cultural issues: 
disgruntled politicians, pushed by their lust of power; ambitious 
people who saw the movement as a vehicle for the launching of 
successful careers; displaced farmers who wanted to get their 
lands back from the Christian settles; victims of army and police 
abuses who regarded the movement as an instrument of revenge; 
religious leaders who welcomed the movement as a chance to 
construct as Islamic theocratic state; idealistic students who were 
move by a social duty; impatient and adventurous young men who 
wanted to test their fighting prowess; and others who joined 
because their friends and relatives were members of the 
movement. The leadership of the movement was initially provided 
by two groups-students and intellectuals, and the disgruntled 
politicians.41  
Among the early works, Wernstedt and Simkins in their study on the role 
of migration in the settlement of Mindanao, observed that the increasing 
migration by Christians into the Southern Philippines has produced considerable 
social unrest. The primary source of tension has been over the ownership of 
land. The Muslims viewed the lands in their areas as traditional and ancestral 
erty belongs to them. The Christians settled in these lands, and hence, the prop                                            
40 Lela Noble, “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 21, Is. 11, November 1981, 1097-1114. 
41 R. Joel Jalal-ud-din De Los Santos, “Towards a Solution of the Moro Problem,” Southeast Asian 
Affairs, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Singapore, 1978, p. 211. Also see, Noble’s 
“Muslim Separatism in the Philippines,” 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate. 
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so-called traditional lands. Usually, the better educated migrant has been able to 
present stronger arguments in courts, and decisions have often been in the 
Christian’s favor, while the Muslim litigants have been considered as 
obstructionists and anachronisms. They concluded that with Christians migration, 
it seems inevitable that Muslims will be increasingly assimilated in the Christian 
society and economy.42 
Costello identifies the four elements that influence the Moro separatist 
movement. The first is the fear among the Muslims that their religious, cultural, 
and political institutions will decline or perish by conceived assimilation into a 
Catholic dominated nation. The second is the bitterness over in-migration of the 
Christians from Luzon and Visayas. The transmigration has dual implications: 
Muslims have been dislocated in what they considered ancient and communal 
land which has changed the demography of the island and thus reducing the 
proportion of the Muslim population to a minority status in their homeland. The 
third is the frustration over the failure of the central government to introduce 
decent development in the area.43 The fourth is the embedded practice of 
warlordism, banditry, and blood feuds.44  
Nicholas Tarling insists that it is impossible to seclude changing religious 
practices, in this context of violent conflict, from the socio-economic and political 
strains of relations between poor Muslim southerners and relatively rich northern 
patronage powers. The policies of the Marcos Regime led to the founding of the 
Philippine Muslim Nationalist League in 1967, that became the More National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), the military arm, which grew rapidly during the 1970s.45 
                                            
42 Frederick L. Wernstedt and Paul D. Simkins, “Migrations and Settlement of Mindanao,” The Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 1, November 1965, 83-103. 
43 Currently, 15 of the Philippines’ poorest provinces are located in the south, which additionally has 
the country’s lowest literacy rate by 75 percent and life expectancy by 57 years in Peter Chalk, “The Davao 
Consensus: A Panacea for the Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao?” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, 1997, 80-83.   
44 Micheal Costello, Muslim Separatist in the Philippines and Thailand available at 
[http://www.efreedomnews.com/pdfFiles /Muslim SeperatistsPhilippines_RAND.pdf]; accessed 14 June 
2003 
45 Nicholas Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, 228. 
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The insurgency in the Southern Philippines is the effect of a general 
underdevelopment of the region, unequal distribution of income, and the 
inadequate effort of the government to integrate the Moros into the political 
institutions of the nation. The rich economic potential of Mindanao has provided 
strong motivation for the government to fight the rebellion since the 1970s. 
The socio-economic inequity is evident in the possession of the land, 
where state policies and programs favor Christian settlers. The migratory policy 
reduced the Moro population from about 75% from the turn of the century to 25% 
in the late 1960s and in the 1990 to about 18%.46 Using Collier’s thesis, this 
decline appears to support the theory that the probability of conflict in Mindanao 
increased in this period. 
Nathan Quimpo argues that the central government neglected Muslim 
Mindanao and the Moros felt the government neglected to provide their basic 
needs adequately or at least to uplift their socio-economic conditions to be on par 
with the Christian majority.47 These conditions for conflict were identified by 
Mohammed who called them frustration, group identity and structural conflicts. 
Finding a common cause, the Muslims became politicized and began to 
organize. In 1968, the insurgents formed the Muslim Independence Movement 
(MIM) and later a more radical organization, the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), which achieved prominence and command. The MNLF’s goal was to 
establish an independent state, protect Muslim practices and culture, and an end 
to subjugation and the return of the lands taken away by Christians.48 Although 
the battle cry is along ethnic and religious lines, the clear grievance was socio-
economic deprivations.  
Thus, Brown, Collier, Mansoob, Murshed, and Mohamed appear to be 
correct in their assertion that social and economic factors are significant drivers 
                                            
46 Rudy Rodil, “The Tri-People Relationship and the Peace Process in Mindanao” (Lecture 
delivered at Inahan sa Kinabuhi Diocesan College Seminary, Iligan City, Philippines, March 1998) 
available at [http://mindanao.com/kalinaw/dev/tri-people.htm]; accessed 26 December 2003. 
47 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the 
Southern Philippines,” Asian Survey, 41:2, April/March 2001, 271-289. 
48 Ibid., 276-277. 
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for civil conflict that brought the Philippines to a civil war as in the case of 
Mindanao. Although most of the economic literature on the subject of economy 
and conflict concentrate on the study of the civil wars in Africa, the Philippine 
case in Mindanao has similar roots. However, there is a major element identified 
by Collier that differentiates the various cases in Africa and the Philippines. The 
Philippines is not dependent upon a prime commodity for exports, which rebels 
and government forces may struggle to control. 
Murshed hypothesizes the critical role of external players as in the case of 
the Muslim separatist rebellion. The rebels received monetary aid and support 
from various Muslim states and from the Organization of the Islamic States. In 
fact, the Philippines had been threatened by Arab oil producers with the 
stoppage of the oil supply in the country should the Philippines continue armed 
repression.49 
Magdalena sees the conflict in Mindanao as more of a cultural and 
political issue. The conflict in Mindanao began as an ethnic problem associated 
with nation-building. He says that as a result of colonial rule, the north-south 
divide50 became apparent.51 Colonial imposition abolished the old social 
institutions like the feudal system based on the sultanate as well as slavery. The 
ethnic resurgence in Mindanao signified Muslim resistance to the government 
agenda of “integration” which the Muslims perceive as absorption into the 
dominant Christian community. In the Philippines, the unitary version of 
nationality has been questioned because, to the Muslims, it is an objectionable 
element. The Moros detest the unavoidable dissipation of their identity into the 
mainstream. This resistance, carried out in a militant way, had resulted in violent 
                                            
49 Thomas M. Mckenna, “Muslim Separatism in the Philippines: Meaningful Autonomy or Endless 
War?” available in [http://www.asiasource.org/asip/mckenna_rebellion.cfm]; accessed 14 July 2003. 
50 The north-south phenomenon reflects the Philippines religious demography. Most of the Christians 
live in the north of the archipelago while the Muslims are concentrated in Mindanao, although today the 
south is composed of 80 percent Christians. The historical thesis is that Moro identity was politicized by the 
Spanish and American colonizers and later by the independent Philippine Government. The Spanish 
colonialization established a geographically oriented north-south divide between Muslims and Christians, 
and the American rule concretized the boundary through migrations and land grants to Christians. 
51 Federico V. Magdalena, “The Peace Process in Mindanao: Problems and Prospects,” Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1997, 245-259. 
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opposition. In the 1970s, the Moros began asserting their Islamic identity to 
prevent further erosion of their Islamic roots. Accordingly, they demanded Muslim 
autonomy or total independence from the Philippine government to defend their 
Muslim identity. 
The peace agreement signed in 1996 between the MNLF and the 
government of the Philippines ended more than 20 years of violent confrontation 
and allowed some degree of local political and economic control. Accordingly, the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established comprising 
four provinces of the Southern Philippines. The peace agreement, which ended 
more then two decades of hostilities, addressed some of the most important 
grievances of the MNLF.  
Bertrand observes that despite hopes and optimism, peace in the 
Southern Philippines remains fragile. He points out several reasons for the failure 
of the peace accord; mismanagement and corruption of the autonomous 
government, insignificant support from other Mindanao groups other than the 
MNLF, failure to address the land issue and to generate the expected benefits. 
He notes that the achievements of the accord are not adequate to rally the 
support of the Christians, Lumad (indigenous people of Mindanao), and even the 
Muslims. Many elements have caused the deterioration of the peace process. 
First, the transitional structures of the autonomy failed to provide a model for 
future autonomous institutions because of mismanagement and corruption. 
Second, the regional government obtained insufficient support from groups other 
than the MNLF. There is a lack of support from other groups including non-
Muslims as well as Muslims, such as the supporters of the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front. Third, the peace accord did not settle the issue of land rights. 
Fourth, the agreement has not brought many of its expected deliverables or 
benefits, especially regarding the promotion of social welfare and raising their 
standards of living. By the end of 1998, the peace agreement had been severely 
weakened. 52 
                                            
52 Bertrand, 37-56. 
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McKenna criticizes the peace agreement for not providing adequate local 
political power and resources. Hence, poverty alleviation, employment and the 
provisions for basic services were barely addressed.53 An example of this is the 
National Steel Company, the Philippines’ largest in the industry at which almost 
all the 4,000 employees are Christian Visayans. Despite the official line that local 
hiring was the policy, no Maranao, a native in the periphery, could be found on 
the union list. And how many Muslims work in the company? About five or ten! 
Not percent, but five or ten out of the 4,000 workers. Fred Hill observes that the 
local Muslims are not educated, and hence, do not qualify to be employed in the 
steel mill.54  
Macapado A. Muslim considers the following as hindrances for the full 
implementation of the peace accord; SPCPD’s55 inadequate capability in 
development management, weak support from the national government, lack of 
peace building focus on development administration, SPCPD’s inadequate power 
in peacekeeping, and the MNLF member’s unrealistic expectations and 
impatience.56 
Peter Chalk examines the significant reactions of the extremist groups 
regarding the 1996 peace accord, citing that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) vigorously reject the peace process for 
these reasons; “failure to respect the letter of the Tripoli Agreement,57 and failure  
                                            
53 McKenna, available at [http://www.asiasource.org/asip/mckenna_peace.cfm. 3]; accessed 14 
November 2003. 
54 Hill, 3. 
55 Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCD), an agency purportedly designed 
to manage peace and development in 14 of Mindanao’s 24 provinces.  
56 Macapado A. Muslim, “The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement: A preliminary Assessment of its 
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266. 
57 The Tripoli Agreement provided among other things the creation of autonomous Muslim region in the 
Southern Philippines consisting of the 13 provinces and 9 cities of Mindanao. This Agreement failed 
because of the opposition of the Christian population to be included in the Muslim region.   
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to include provision for a fully independent Islamic state.”58 On other hand, the 
extreme Christians consider the peace agreement as an unacceptable 
concession.59 
With the exemption of Chalk, Bertrand, McKenna and Muslim categorically 
recognize that the apparent failure of either the ARMM or the central government 
was a result of not adequately addressing the poverty issue. The ARMM 
leadership has been accused of mismanagement and corruption, which led to the 
mismanagement of the delivery of the basic needs of the people. On the other 
hand, ARMM blames the national government for insufficient financial support. I 
agree with Bertrand’s astute observation that corruption is the prime culprit in the 
failure of the ARMM to bring economic amelioration in the region. 
These frustrations increased armed clashes between the rebels and the 
government forces. To sustain the movement, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf and Al 
Qaeda provided financial and logistical aid. “The links between the MILF and Al 
Qaeda are well established. There is ample evidence that during the 1990s the 
MILF received funding and training from the Al Qaeda operatives,”60 says Abuza. 
Colonial aggression was a significant variable in Muslim apprehension, but 
the lasting effect was the politicization of the Muslim identity as a separate 
nation. Magdalena cites a government study done in 1955 which attributed Moro 
rebellions to a feeling of alienation from the Filipino nation as a whole. Based 
upon historical data, Muslim grievances over land distribution and the lack of 
political representation were the result of the colonial era policies and strategies 
of integration. Land issues have been the most fundamental Muslim concern and 
important factor fueling the conflict. Private property, as understood by the  
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Christians, does not exist in the minds of the Moro lower class as a rule. The 
Muslim thinks of land as belonging to the clan while to the Christian it is a matter 
of individual ownership.61 
E. STRATEGIES AND POLICIES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE 
CONFLICT 
Magdalena advises that in order to strengthen peace and to mitigate the 
prospect of renewed war and escalation of violence, the warring forces must 
mutually discuss the problem rather than threaten intimidation. Violence is a 
cycle because it perpetuates itself with counter violence. Thus, the belligerent 
parties must renounce the use of force and agree to demobilize and disarm. 
Magdalena advances that the party, which has the greater capacity to wage war, 
should lead and willingly renounce the use of force. The state must not flex its 
might against the will of its citizens particularly when the employment of such 
power does not rest on justice and fairness.62 
Collier argues that all the policies for conflict prevention could be applied 
in post conflict peace building, however, these are not adequate. He claims that 
several factors account for the substantial increase in the risk of the continuation 
of war such as logistical capability of the rebel, people’s political polarization and 
the erosion of the people’s norm to inhibition to violence.63 What then is the 
appropriate course for a country that is in a conflict trap? The measures to be 
undertaken as suggested by Collier, first is to identify the structures of risks, then 
build the priorities of risk reduction. The next step is to reduce the largest risk.64 
Accordingly, the Philippines should immediately focus on the management of 
ethnic dominance, and the strategy to increase the level of per capita income. 
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The Civil War and Development Policy is a document prepared by the 
World Bank. It discusses the policies and strategies that can mitigate the global 
incidence of civil wars. The paper proposes considerations on the “two groups of 
policies for restoring post-conflict societies: measures to revive the economy - 
notably, aid and policy reform, and military interventions – notably demobilization 
and external peacekeeping.”65 
In the same paper, Quimpo advocates that the first step towards de-
escalation of the conflict is for the contending parties to go back to the 
negotiating table, and he also proposes the inclusion of non-Muslim groups in the 
negotiation and the continuous participation of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference in the peace negotiation.66 
According to McKenna with the Philippine government’s experiences of 
three decades of fighting, its “get tough” policy will produce the opposite 
outcome. He recommends that protection of the Muslim cultural heritage and 
improvement of the Moro livelihood and living conditions rather than empty 
autonomy arrangements or combat operations should be undertaken to resolve 
the conflict.67 
I agree with these proposals, particularly those that will increase the level 
of income, generate growth and reduce social inequality. However, in order to 
realize these goals, immediate measures should be undertaken to improve the 
performance of the local bureaucracy and new institutions should be organized to 
raise resources. The government should institute strategies to prevent corruption.  
Is the Moros demand to return these alleged ancestral lands reasonable 
and feasible? Magdalena admonishes that peaceful coexistence can be attained 
by recognizing that every citizen has the right to live in the defined area, or in 
other words, a shared “homeland.” Although most of the Mindanao inhabitants 
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are migrants, they have the same privileges and rights on the land where they 
earn a living. The demand of some Muslim leaders and intellectuals for the 
Christians to return to Luzon and Visayas is harsh and divisive. It is important 
that the Muslim’s way of life should be afforded protection and their right to self-
government should be recognized. 
Christopher Hewitt warns that making concessions does not necessarily 
reduce violence. He points out that the governments of Spain and Great Britain 
tried to reduce opposition posed by separatists groups by making concessions 
but failed. Concessions were ineffective because people viewed them as tokens 
which should have been given earlier. Also, reforms instituted by both 
governments were seen as a sign of weaknesses. Once the establishment failed 
to repress dissent forcefully, Hewitt observes that people will be emboldened to 
ask for more68. Reforms are factors that affect the degree of violence, but they 
do so in a complex manner and authorities should anticipate that concessions 
from the position of weaknesses will increase violence.69  
The conflict resolution strategy requires a multi-disciplinary approach. The 
government should focus on strengthening state capacity to enforce authority 
while at the same time empowering the Moros toward political and economic 
power. Moro self-determination should be allowed to prosper as part of the 
country’s democratization process but stop short of secession. The international 
community, particularly the OIC, should play a vital role in persuading warring 
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III. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT (ARRIVAL OF ISLAM TO 
1965) 
The Muslim Filipinos or Moros70 are geographically concentrated in the 
southern part of the country in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. The Moros are a 
collection of tribal groups and they have been traditionally composed of three 
major and ten minor ethno-linguistic71 tribes and dispersed across the southern 
islands. The three largest aggregations are the Maguindanaons of the Pulangi 
River Basin of central Mindanao, the Maranaos of the Lanao Lake region of 
central Mindanao, and the Tausugs of Jolo Island in the Sulu archipelago. They 
are major factors in the local and domestic politics of present times. In some 
parts of their traditional territory, the Muslim inhabitants remain the majority. 
About 98 percent of the population of the Sulu archipelago is Muslim. In the 
entire Mindanao-Sulu region, however, Philippine Muslims make up about 17 
percent of the population. This is due primarily to large scale Christian in-
migration from the Visayas and Luzon in the second half of the century.72 Before 
the arrival of the colonizers, the Muslims had established different cultural, social 
and political institutions. They have distinct customary laws (adat), costumes, 
dances and art forms. Their community is organized around the datu system 
which is the local chief with both executive and military power. With the 
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introduction of Islam, the powerful datus eventually assumed the title of sultan. 
Today this system still exists in some areas albeit with diminished power and 
prerogatives. 
The Moros battled bitterly against Spanish and American rule and the 
attempts to colonize the Muslims met with little success. The Americans 
continued the subjugation and the Moros fought the occupation troops in the 
futile hope of creating an independent sovereign nation. The Muslims objected to 
the inclusion of Mindanao and Sulu into the Republic of the Philippines for they 
wanted to be left alone.73 The Moro resisted the authority of the new central 
government and they spawned insurgencies against the Manila government 
beginning in the late 1960s.  
A. ARRIVAL OF ISLAM  
In the era before the advent of the western colonizer, the Philippine 
archipelago was not a single political entity or nation, and Mindanao was virtually 
a separate state. Islam came to the Philippines via trade routes that emanated 
from Arabia overland through Central Asia and then overseas to India, China and 
thence into Southeast Asia.74 During the 10th century, the Philippines provided a 
link in the trade routes between India and China, and thus giving rise to the 
Islamic settlement in the coastal areas of the Sulu archipelago. There is a strong 
indication that Arab ships, or at least ships commanded by Arabs, had reached 
China from the Philippines by the 10th century.75 Arab merchants and Islamic 
teachers or sufis introduced Islam in Mindanao to the Moros.  
Although there is no sufficient evidence to precisely date the introduction 
of Islam in Mindanao and Sulu, a piece of archeological information may support 
the theory that Islam arrived much earlier than the end of the 14th century. 
Graves and tombstones of Muslim colonies on the slope of Bud Dato were found 
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indicating that Islam possibly arrived during this period.76 As in the Malayan 
peninsula, Indonesia and Borneo, the first converts in Mindanao and Sulu were 
those living in trading posts or along the trade routes.77 The economic and 
political benefit may have motivated the datus and other leaders to accept 
Islam.78 
In Sulu, Islam was introduced in the Philippines in 1380 when an Arabian 
scholar by the name of Makhdum Karim began preaching the teachings of 
Mohammed,79 and converted an enormous number of unbelievers into Islam. 
Makhdum, reverently called Sharif Awliya, founded the first mosque in the 
Philippines at Tubig-Indangan on Simunul Island.80   
In 1390, Rajah Baguinda, a pretty ruler of Menengkaw, Sumatra arrived 
and continued the works of Makhdum Karim. By this time, a flourishing Muslim 
community in Sulu emerged and by the middle of the following century, the 
government began with the establishment of the Sultanate of Sulu. The first 
crowned sultan was Syed Abubakar, an Arab from South Arabia, who was 
believed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Upon his 
ascension to the throne, Islam spread quickly to all parts of Sulu.81 
In mainland Mindanao, during the early part of the 16th century, Sharif 
Mohammed Kabungsuwan successfully introduced and firmly established Islam 
and founded the sultanate of Maguindanao. Kabungsuwan established his power 
in Maguindanao upon arrival at the mouth of the Pulangi River. He reformed the 
whole system of government among his converts.82 Kabungsuwan was sired by 
a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed who emigrated from Hadramut (present 
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day Yemen), southern Arabia, to Johore, Malay Peninsula.83 Historical evidence 
records give the impression that the arrival of Kabungsuwan and the conversion 
of the inhabitants of Maguindanao to Islam were accomplished peacefully. He 
had received the submission of many chiefs, all of whom he converted to Islam.84  
Another organized social and political system, which was established 
later, was the Sultanate of Buayan, Kabuntalan85 and the Pat- a- pangampong 
ko ranao, meaning “Four States of Lanao.”86 This “Four States” established a 
federal system of organization whereby the member states were linked together 
by an ancient rule, called taritib, which calls for peaceful and harmonious 
relations for the promotion of common welfare. Similarly, it is believed that Sharif 
Alawi, an early Muslim missionary, came possibly by way of Maguindanao to 
Lanao and converted the pagans in Lanao and the nearby areas.87 
The primary political unit in the pre-Spanish Muslim era was the sultanate 
and the greatest and most powerful sultanates were those of Sulu and 
Maguindanao and they were believed to have been established by missionary 
rulers of Arabia. These governments pursued diplomatic and trade relations 
among themselves and with the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia. The 
sultanate, who is also the leading datu was founded and operated under Islamic 
or customary traditions and was considered a representative of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The Moro leaders, therefore, are not a rule of men, but of the 
Qur’an. 
Islam caused a sense of community and brought about significant and 
dramatic transformations among the groups in the Philippines which have 
embraced it. Islamic doctrines introduced new laws, novel ethical standards, and 
a new outlook in the meaning and direction of life which influenced the individual 
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converts. This Islamization of the island led to a sense of cultural identity that 
differentiated the Muslims from the non-believers elsewhere in the country. 
Muslims, thus, also began to raise their level of consciousness associating 
themselves with a wider community—one that extended from Morocco on the 
Atlantic Ocean to Malay lands in the South China Sea.88 
Although most Muslim Filipinos have customarily lacked any degree of 
unity beyond tribe or clan, the Islamization of Mindanao and Sulu generated an 
ideological bond among the various ethnic tribes in the area that generated a 
new sense of ethnic identity that differentiates the Muslim from non-Muslim 
inhabitants. Thus, Islam emerged as a rallying religious, political, and historical 
strength that enabled the Muslims to violently resist the Spanish subjugation and 
later American colonialism. Islam and its survival remains the underlying factor of 
the current rift between Muslim and Christian Filipinos.89  
B. THE SPANISH COLONIAL ERA (1521-1898) 
The 16th century caused consequential change to the Filipinos. It shifted 
them from a life of freedom to a virtual state of captivity for the country became 
the subject of contention of foreign colonial powers. It made the society reliant 
upon events happening half way around the globe in Europe and America. 
Filipino culture, Asian in its roots and expressions, found itself facing the impact 
of an alien Western culture. The Spaniards were the first innovators and the 
agents of change in the Philippines. Their arrival belonged to that era in 
European history called the “Age of Geographical Discovery and Expansion,” 
when Europeans ventured to the East across waters yet unknown to them.  
Demand for highly profitable spices and other products of the “Spice 
Islands” by the Europeans in the 14th century led to worldwide competition for 
colonies and trading bases in Asia. The long history of the Portuguese and the 
Spanish wars against the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula and in northern Africa 
had provoked a strong missionary spirit which led them to find lands for 
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conversion to Christianity as a way of fighting the Muslims. In search of Oriental 
goods and new routes, the Portuguese found a way to India by sailing eastward 
from the Cape of Good Hope.90   
When the Portuguese captured trading bases in the lower Malay 
Peninsula, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands, King Charles V of Spain gave his 
consent and financed the expedition in 1519 of Ferdinand Magellan, a 
Portuguese, and promised the King the wealth of the orient.91 From Spain on 20 
September 1519, Magellan sailed westward from Spain around South America, 
discovering the Strait of Magellan, and across the Pacific. In March 1521, the 
Spaniards set foot on Philippine soils and the first meeting was friendly, 
indicating that the Filipinos were used to seeing foreigners.92 In Cebu, the 
Spaniards baptized the chieftain along with several hundred other natives. 
Magellan later wished to subdue the nearby Island of Mactan, whose chieftain 
named Lapulapu was hostile to the Spaniards and refused to recognize the 
sovereignty of the King of Spain. Magellan was killed in the battle and only 18 
survivors returned to Spain.93 The Muslim Filipinos claimed this encounter as the 
first armed struggle against Spain.94 
The failure of several Spanish expeditions to the Far East did not deter 
King Charles V’s son and successor, Philip II, to order sending another 
expedition to the Philippines to colonize the Philippines and to christianize the 
natives. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the head of the expedition in Cebu in 1565, 
established the first permanent Spanish settlement in the Philippines.95 When the 
Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, Islam was already developed among the 
people of the Southern Philippines, particularly in the Sultanates of Sulu, 
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Maguindanao, and Buayan as well as the several small sultanates and their 
respective areas of jurisdiction. However, in other places of the archipelago, like 
Manila, Southern Luzon and in the Visayan Islands, Islam was still in its early 
stages of development.96  
By means of the sword and the cross, the Spaniards accomplished the 
colonization of Luzon and the Visayas islands and converted the natives to the 
Christian faith, but similar attempts to establish Christianity in the Southern 
Philippines met stiff and bloody encounters from the very beginning.97 Violent 
conflict between the Spaniards and the Muslims Filipinos flamed into the so-
called Moro Wars-a series of bitter wars of attrition that lasted for more than three 
centuries from 1569 to 1898. Christian converts from Luzon and Visayan Islands 
aided these fierce confrontations between the Muslims and the Spaniards. These 
bitter wars implanted the seeds of the Moro angst, which have persistently grown 
in modern times.98 These historic incidents had molded the Moro attitudes and 
relations to all non-Muslim foreigners as well as to non-Muslim Filipinos.99  
The earliest clash of struggle was fought over the political and commercial 
supremacy in the Philippines between Spain and Brunei. In the confrontations, 
not only was Spain able to secure a foothold in the Philippines, but also managed 
to destroy the Manila settlement and fort that was governed by a Bornean 
aristocracy and eliminate Bornean traders from the Visayas and northern 
Mindanao. Spain gained full control of Manila with the defeat of Rajah Sulayman, 
Rajah Matanda and Rajah Lakandula. The Brunei influence in the archipelago 
virtually became nil with the attack of the Brunei Sultanate in 1578.100 
 
                                            
96 Allan R. Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao, Philippines” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff College, 2002), 20.  
97 Ibid., 16. 
98 John D. Harber, “Conflict and Compromise in the Southern Philippines: The Case of Moro Identity” 
(Master’s Thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 1998), 20. 
99 Majul, “The Muslim in the Philippines…” 6. 
100 Ibid, 7. 
35 
After the fall of Manila, the Spaniards caused the conquest and settlement 
of some provinces in Luzon and Visayas. The lack of unity among the 
barangays101 which were separate and independent from one another facilitated 
most of the conquest of the Philippines.102 
After the Brunei expedition, Spanish colonial expansion focused on 
Mindanao and Sulu. In 1578, the first Spanish military expedition to Mindanao 
and Sulu was sent on the orders of Governor General Francisco de Sande to 
Captain Esteban Rodriquez de Figueroa, the commander of the expeditions, to 
subdue the pagan inhabitants, to curb piracy against Spanish shipping, and end 
Moro raids on Christian settlements in Visayas and Luzon. He was also obligated 
to colonize and to christianize the Moros in similar fashion with respect to other 
Filipino groups.103 Spanish policy on christianization certainly is one of the root 
causes of the conflict and animosity between the Muslims and Spaniards and 
their Christian Filipino allies.”104 Captain Figueroa’s expedition cost him his life 
during a fierce battle in Maguindanao.  
In 1599, the Moros had decided to change their strategy by bringing the 
war over into enemy territory and staged counterattacks, instead of the defensive 
engagement with the Spaniards on their territory. The Moros conducted year 
round raids and overwhelmed the natives in the Spanish-protected territories 
which inflicted fear, despair and anxiety. The Muslim raiders successfully 
penetrated and conducted punitive raids deep into the Christian territories in 
Luzon and the Visayas resulting in the depopulation of many towns due to deaths 
and captivity of Christians.105 Slavery was used to weaken the non-Muslim’s 
with the Spaniards. The slaves were used as boat resolve to ally themselves                                             
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rowers to bolster the Moro war machine.106 Additionally, Muslim raiders sold 
thousands of captive Filipino men, women and children at slave markets in 
Makassar and Batavia (now Jakarta).107  
The Spaniards were determined to conquer the sultanates of Sulu and 
Maguindanao. Military campaigns launched by the Spaniards enlisted the natives 
they previously conquered and christianized, thus, the converts were made to 
fight the Muslims for the glory of Spain and Christianity. Like the Moros, the 
Spaniards adopted the policy of depopulating the Muslim areas. Accordingly, the 
Spaniards resorted to burning settlements, plantations, fields, and orchards as 
well as enslaving captured Muslims for service in the galleys.108  
The crucial point in Moro history took place in 1619 when Sultan Qudarat 
ascended the throne of the Maguindanao sultanate. He consolidated the most 
powerful alliance ever assembled against Spain. The sultanate’s range of 
influence include, aside from his traditional dominion over the whole of Cotabato, 
Lanao, Davao, Misamis, Bukidnon and Zamboanga, was so extensive that he 
was able to collect tributes as far as the coast of Borneo and some parts of 
Basilan and the Visayas. During his reign, he held Spain at bay for half a century 
and outlasted about eight governor generals. The Spaniards considered him the 
single greatest obstacle in the colonization efforts of Mindanao.  
Relentless military operations launched by the Spaniards led to the fall of 
the Sultan Qudarat’s capital of Lamitan, Basilan in 1637. The Sultan and his 
people retired to the interior and adopted a policy of minimum confrontation with 
the Spaniards to prevent the extermination of the Maguindanaos as a people. 
The following year the Sultan of Sulu’s strong hold in Jolo was conquered. For 
similar reasons, the people of Sulu also retired to the interior or moved to other 
islands. Although the Spaniards captured the strongholds of the two sultanates,  
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the possibility of Muslim retaliation led them to make peace with the 
Maguindanao in 1645. The treaty with the Sulus in 1646 covered the departure of 
the Spaniards from the island of Jolo.109 
Similarly, in the face of the Dutch victories in the Moluccas and the 
Koxinga’s invasion threat, the Spaniards found it essential to consolidate their 
home defense. Spanish troops deployed in various Mindanao stations were 
recalled to defend Manila. In 1663, the main fort in Zamboanga was also 
abandoned.110  
In 1718, when the twin threats abated and with 50 years of relative peace, 
the Spaniards re-fortified their abandoned garrison in Zamboanga. In an attempt 
to reduce the Muslims to vassalage, the Spaniards devised a plan to convert the 
sultans of Sulu and Maguindanao, and thereafter, to effect the eventual 
conversion of the datus and other followers. The Moros reacted by conducting 
devastating raids on the northern and central islands of the Philippines, causing 
widespread disruption of the economic life in the areas under Spanish control. In 
response to the Spanish policy to enslave captured Muslims and destroy 
settlements, the Moros struck back by taking thousands of captives from the 
Visayas.111  
During the 19th century, the Sulu archipelago became the focus of 
European competition. In 1843, the French were interested in establishing a 
naval station in Basilan while the British sought to review their trade agreement 
with Sulu. Alarmed by these developments, Spain sent an expedition to Sulu in 
1851, on the pretext that the island is a haven of “piracy,” which  resulted in the 
capture of Jolo. A treaty was signed by the sultan and it claimed Sulu as a 
Spanish protectorate. Not trusting Sulu, the Spaniards made a more serious 
attempt to conquer and establish permanent garrisons on the island. The use of 
modern navy-steamboats equipped with heavy artillery in the campaign, gave the  
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invader an advantage and in 1876 Jolo was captured by assault. The Sultan 
retired to the interior of the island, but Spanish control over the island was never 
complete. 
C. THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION OF 1896 
Nationalistic awakenings, fueled by colonial injustices, racial degradation 
and discrimination, particularly in clerical appointments and flagrant agrarian 
exploitation by the religious orders, resulted in numerous regional uprisings 
against the Spanish colonial administration. The resentment against the colonial 
master reached its peak in the 1890s and the call for independence was inspired 
by Jose Rizal112 and other propagandists who penned numerous articles and 
published in the newspaper La Solidaridad whose objective was to raise the 
national spirit and restore the dignity of their countrymen. 
On 23 August 1896, in the spirit of nationalism and as a protest against 
the abuses and injustices of the colonial master, Filipinos, led by Andres 
Bonifacio, took to the field against the Spaniards in Manila. Unlike the members 
of the middle class, Bonifacio and his plebian followers were not only fighting for 
reforms but were interested in securing the independence and freedom of the 
Philippines by force of arms.113 
General Emilio Aguinaldo was elected President by Filipino revolutionaries 
in the convention of Tejeros, Cavite in March 1897. He launched periodic military 
operations against the Spaniards but suffered heavy losses prompting him to 
accept an agreement, The Truce of Biyak-na-Bato, with the Spanish Governor 
General. Aguinaldo was paid the amount of Php 800,000 on the condition that he 
and the revolutionary government go into exile in Hong Kong. Aguinaldo met the 
American consul at Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildham. The latter advanced that 
ilippines, Aguinaldo should establish a dictatorial upon returning to the Ph                                            
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government during the war against Spain. Aguinaldo also met Admiral George 
Dewey, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Asiatic squadron to seek support for the 
Philippine revolution and also pushed for alliances between the two countries 
should war occur between the United States and Spain.114 The war did break 
out, but no formal agreement was adopted, and Aguinaldo had to rely on the 
good intentions of the United States.115 
President Aguinaldo sought the participation and support of the Moros in 
the struggle against Spain by sending a proposal claiming that he is empowered 
to “negotiate with the Muslims Sulu and Mindanao to establish national solidarity 
on the basis of a real federation absolute respect for their beliefs and 
traditions.”116  
The Moro wars were significant factors in the development of the 
Philippine revolution although the Muslim Filipino never sympathized with the 
Christian Filipino revolution of 1896-99. The energies and resources that were 
employed in Moroland created a favorable condition for a revolutionary 
movement. The Spanish authorities failed to protect the Christian communities 
under their protection despite the exorbitant tax and the forced labor to support 
the campaign.117 
D.  THE AMERICAN COLONIAL ERA (1898-1946) 
Under the Treaty of Paris (1898), the United States ceded the entire 
Spanish colony and the Americans inherited the Muslim problem from Spain.118 
The Philippines again became a colony of a powerful nation. On 21 December 
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1898, President William McKinley issued a definite statement of American policy 
in the Philippines. In his “benevolent assimilation” proclamation McKinley said 
that the Americans: 
came not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the 
natives in their homes, in their employment, and in their persona 
and religious rights… by assuring them in every possible way that 
measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a 
free people, and by proving them that the mission of the United 
States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway 
of justice and right for arbitrary rule.119 
Like its predecessors, the United Stated pursued the policy of total control 
over the region and annexed Mindanao to the Philippine central government. 
However, unlike the Spanish who were concerned with religious assimilation, the 
Americans emphasized the idea of democracy to the natives.  
Thus, the Americans implemented democratic institutions, laws and 
established schools.120 To speed up the political integration of Mindanao, the 
Americans employed civil officials and clerks in the area. They also encouraged 
the migration of Christian farmers to settle in Mindanao to teach Muslim farmers 
modern agricultural techniques. The intention was altruistic but unwise as in the 
coming years, this policy brought the region into conflict and bloodshed.121 
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1.  Indirect Rules and the Bates Treaty 
The early Muslim-American contact and military occupation123 in the 
Moroland began on May 1899 and the Americans found the Moros still in control 
of their lands.124 The Americans sought Muslim neutrality and friendship in the 
Philippine-American War (1899-1901)125 which was flaring in Luzon. Thus, the 
significant American concern was to obtain Muslim acknowledgement of United 
States sovereignty in Mindanao and Sulu. The Americans feared the eventual 
tactical alliance between the Filipino revolutionaries and the Moro warriors which 
would be too difficult to handle.  
Thus, the Americans sent Brigadier General John Bates to Sulu to 
negotiate a treaty with Sultan Jamalul Kiram II. The agreement that was reached 
and signed on August 1899, acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States 
over the Sulu archipelago and its dependencies and agreed to suppress piracy. 
The United States pledged to respect the authority of the Sultan and his clan 
leaders, the datus, and not to interfere in the prevailing Moros’ practice of their 
religion and their customs.126 The Americans also guaranteed complete 
protection of the sultan and his followers from foreign powers and payment of the 
salaries of certain Sulu leaders from the government.127 
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Initially, the Moros and the Americans were quite comfortable with the 
arrangement in the way that the treaty defined the relationship.128 The 
occupation force did not interfere with the datu system and religious matters.129 
Within the limits of the noninterference policy, the Americans made modern 
medical care available and a few schools were opened with both soldiers and 
civilians as teachers. However, American officers were uncomfortable with the 
noninterference policy because certain features of the Moro culture – 
administration of justice, slavery, autocratic relationship of the chieftains and 
followers- offended their western sense of justice and good order.130 After the 
Philippine-American War ended, more troops poured into Mindanao to occupy 
ports in the region. This development aroused the Moro’s insecurity concerning 
their practice of religion and way of life. In 1903, the Americans imposed custom 
regulations, collected taxes, surveyed lands, conducted a census, and more 
importantly, forbade the time-honored Moro practice of slavery. Soon enough the 
uneasiness and suspicion exploded into violence. Some datus rose up and 
attacked American soldiers. The Muslim hostility was interpreted as a challenge 
to American sovereignty. As a result, the American governance shifted from 
noninterference to direct rule with the establishment of the Moro Province.131 
The military occupation of the southern Philippines lasted from 1899 to 
1903. Aside from the unhappiness of the American authorities, the passage of 
the Philippine Bill of 1902, which provides for the eventual granting of 
independence, prompted the American authorities to abandon the policy of 
indirect rule. Also, the new policy of direct rule was envisioned to prepare for the 
integration of the Moros into a modern political body132 and the insistence of the 
Christian Filipino leaders that the Moroland was inseparable from Philippine 
territory. Under the new political arrangement, the American mandate was to 
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implement protection of the common people from the oppression of the sultans 
and datus, and the introduction of the American concept of justice.   
In 1903, the Americans established the Moro province, which was 
patterned after the Spanish “politico-military district” system and the line of 
responsibility, stretched from the Provincial Governor in Zamboanga to the datu 
who served as the head of the tribal ward.133 Under American stewardship, 
selected Muslim leaders were clothed with limited political authority. The 
reorganization of the region had directly challenged and threatened the authority 
of the traditional community leaders.134 Similarly, a new legal system through the 
“tribal Ward Court” system was attempted to replace the sharia or Islamic law. 
The Kiram-Bates Treaty, which clearly laid the guiding relationship of 
noninterference in the domestic affairs of the Moros, was the principal obstruction 
for the implementation of the direct rule.135 On 2 March 1904, based on Major 
General Leonard Wood’s report citing the failure of the Sultan and his datus “to 
discharge the duties and fulfill the conditions imposed on them by said 
agreement”136 the treaty was unilaterally abrogated.137 On 21 March 1904, the 
Sultan was notified of the decision that also meant forfeiture of his annuities and 
he would now be subjected to the laws enacted for the Moro province.138 
The American policy of direct rule unwittingly transgressed the social 
structure, customs and laws by which the Moros had lived for centuries. To the 
Muslims, the American policy in the Moroland to develop, civilize, educate, and 
train the Moros in the art of democratic governance were, in fact, an imposition of 
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alien law and infidel customs. The American administrators failed to recognize or 
ignored that Muslim Filipinos saw no separation whatever between the sacred 
and the secular. The concept of the separation of the church and states was 
unknown to the Filipino Muslims for they believed that their laws and customs 
were in line with the teachings of the Holy Qur’an. Thus, many Moros resisted to 
the death the fundamental changes of their beliefs and their traditions.139 
Bloody resistance grew and the Moro province remained under military 
rule until 1913.140 The American military governors led by Generals Woods, Bliss 
and Pershing relentlessly pursued military solution against “bandits and 
outlaws.”141 Similarly, the new political structure altered the Moro economic 
lifestyle which was based on the practice of slavery. This contributed to the 
erosion of the power of the sultanate. Many Muslims violently opposed the 
abolition of slavery, showing strong opposition that resulted in the massacres of 
Bud Dajo and Bud Bagsak and many other uprisings.142 The bloodiest encounter 
between the Americans and the Moros was the battle of Bud Dajo, Sulu, on 
March 1906. After two days of fierce fighting about 1,000 Moros, including 
women and children, were slaughtered. Only six survived, while the American 
forces suffered 21 killed and 73 wounded.143 Another major military encounter 
was the battle of Bud Bagsak, Sulu, on 11-15 June 1913 over the issue of the 
disarmament policy which the Moros vigorously resisted for they would never 
surrender their firearms. Brigadier General John Pershing led the American 
troops and after five days of combat action, 500 Moros were annihilated against 
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14 killed and 13 wounded from the American forces.144 After numerous military 
losses, the Moros realized the futility of continued resistance in the face of 
modern weaponry, and as a result, under the administration of General Pershing, 
the Moros were disarmed.145 It was estimated during the period from 1903-1935 
that 15,000 to 20,000 Moros were killed as a result of the armed resistance to 
American colonial rule.146 
2. Direct Rule 
Succeeding General Pershing in 15 December 1913 was Frank 
Carpenter, the first civilian governor of the Moro Province. He was responsible 
for the reorganization of the province into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu 
which extended to the southern Philippines and the general laws of the country 
and the general forms and procedures of government followed in the provinces 
were applied nationwide. Governor Carpenter is credited for vigorously carrying 
out the policy of “Filipinization”147 being pushed through by Governor General 
Harrison,148 head of the Insular Government. Under his administration, Filipino 
officials, although mostly Christians, were appointed to assumed increasingly 
greater responsibilities in the government of the Moroland. To integrate the 
Muslims into national life, Christian Filipino officials endeavored to educate, 
civilize and train the Muslims in self-government. Public schools were made 
compulsory and Muslim scholars were sent to Manila and the United States for  
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higher education. Similarly, the Muslims were able to occupy local and provincial 
government positions and some were appointed as members of the Philippine 
Legislature.149 
The unification process of the administrative structures of Mindanao and 
Sulu were rapidly implemented by extending the jurisdiction of the central 
government agencies and bureaus of the Moroland. In 1916, the legislative 
power over the Moroland was absorbed by the Philippine legislature as provided 
in the Jones regulation.150 Under the Jones Law, the Bureau of Non-Christian 
Tribes took over jurisdiction from the abolished Department of Mindanao and 
Sulu, and this new arrangement placed the Moroland under the direct control of a 
Manila-based bureau for the first time.  
The adoption of the “policy of attraction” and the Filipinization were not 
only the important highlights of the Carpenter administration but more importantly 
the signing on 22 March 1915 of an agreement better known as the Kiram-
Carpenter Agreement whereby the sultan abdicated all his claims to temporal 
power in Sulu.151 The sultan, however, retained his position as titular leader of 
the Islamic faith in the Sulu archipelago and that the Moros “shall have the same 
religious freedom … and practice of which is not in violation of the basic 
principles of the laws of the United States.” The acquiescence to this accord 
apparently suggests the helplessness to resist the tide of change in Muslim 
society. Although some Moros co-opted with the assimilation program pursued 
by the government, many stubbornly clung to the old ways and a few others 
resigned themselves to becoming “outlaws.”152 
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3. Land and the Migration Policies 
The United States was able to colonize the southern Philippines in two 
decades whereas the Spaniards failed to do so in three centuries and one of the 
successes could be attributed to the “demographic model of colonization.”153 
After the pacification campaign, the Americans began the resettlement program 
and encouraged Christian inhabitants from Luzon and Visayas to emigrate to 
Mindanao and Sulu and the government declared the entire country public land, 
including those considered by the Moros as their ancestral lands. The insular 
government enacted a series of laws concerning land and homesteading that 
was designed to encourage especially landless peasants of the north to migrate 
to Mindanao. These series of laws wiped out Moro communal and ancestral 
lands, and provided for less and less lands for the Muslims. The Land 
Registration Act (Act No. 4960) required the registration of all lands occupied by 
any person, group or corporation. Most Moros lost their communal lands as a 
result. Most Moros were bound only by traditions and customary laws, and 
refused to obtain land titles either out of either ignorance or a sense of 
resistance.154 Likewise, Acts 2254 and 2280 of 1913, created agricultural 
colonies (seven in Cotabato and one each in Lanao and Basilan) and 
encouraged Filipino migrants from the north to settle in the so-called public lands 
in Mindanao and Sulu and by 1930, some 17 agricultural communities had been 
created.155 Public Land Act 2874 (1919) was clearly inequitable in that the 
Christian Filipino settler was awarded a twenty-four-hectare lot, while a Moro was 
allowed only ten hectares.156 Aside from this discrimination, most Muslim 
Filipinos refused to register their ancestral lands.157 
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4. Opposition to Annexation  
In the 1920s, the Insular Government appointed all Filipino Christians as 
governors of Sulu, Cotabato and Lanao to replace the existing Americans. These 
appointments sent a wrong signal to the Moros for they interpreted Filipinization 
to actually mean “Christianization” of the bureaucracy in the Moroland.158 
Already, the Moros were distrustful, uneasy, and perhaps fearful of the Christian 
Filipinos because they fought together with the Spaniards for such a long time. 
Christian Filipinos vigorously pursued the assimilation and Filipinization programs 
in the Moroland that meant, from the Muslim Filipino’s point of view, “being ruled 
by their enemies.”159  
When the United States government promised to grant independence to 
the Filipino people, the 57 prominent Moro leaders filed their intense opposition 
to be incorporated under the new Philippine republic stating clearly:  
We are independent for 500 years. Even Spain failed to conquer 
us. If the U.S. quits the Philippines and the Filipinos attempt to 
govern us, we will fight.160 
In a petition to the United States, on June 9, 1921, the Moros of Sulu declared 
their intention to remain part of the United States instead of being annexed in the 
independent Philippine nation.161 
Three years later, in Zamboanga, the Moro leaders claiming a 
representation of about 500,000 Muslim Filipinos, asked the U.S. Congress that 
the “Islands of Mindanao and Sulu, and the Island of Palawan be made an 
unorganized territory of the United States of America" in anticipation that in the 
event the United States would yield dominion over its colonies and other non-self  
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governing territories, Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan would be granted separate 
independence. The “Declaration of Rights and Purposes” contains the following 
excerpt: 
The event that the United States grants independence to the 
Philippine Islands without provision our retention under the 
American flag it is our firm intention and resolve to declare 
ourselves an Independent constitutional sultanate to be known to 
world as Moro Nation. It is the duty of the congress of the United 
States to make provision at once, for the security and protection 
promised to us when we surrendered our arms to the United States 
Army. This promise is just as sacred as any alleged promises you 
may have made the Christian Filipinos. Have left us defenseless, 
and it is your duty to protect us or return to us the weapons you 
took from and which we freely gave yon, relying on your 
promises.162 
In reaction to the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth, the last 
stage toward independence, 190 Lanao datus and leaders gathered in Dansalan 
(now Marawi City) on 18 March 1935 and passed a strong worded Manifesto and 
pleaded with President Franklin D. Roosevelt to exclude Mindanao and Sulu in 
the grant of independence to the Filipinos.163 Part of it reads: 
…because we have learned that the United States is going to give 
the Philippines independence… we want to tell you that the 
Philippines … is populated by two peoples with two different 
religious practices traditions. The Christian Filipinos occupy the 
islands of Luzon and the Visayas. The Moros (Muslims) 
predominate in the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. With regard to 
the forthcoming independence we foresee that the condition we 
and our children will be characterized by unrest, sufferings and 
misery…We do not want to be included in the Philippine 
Independence (for) once an independent Philippines is launched 
there will be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos because 
from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived 
harmoniously. Our practices, laws and decisions of our Moro 
lenders should be respected… Our religion should not be curtailed 
anyway… All our practices which are incidental to religion of Islam 
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should be respected because these things are what a Muslim 
desires to live for … Our religion is no more, our lives are no 
score.164  
The Americans did not give due consideration to the request of suzerainty 
because, at this time, the Christian Nationalist Filipinos had established a better 
relationship with the Americans.165 The Christian Filipinos readily embraced the 
American educational system, adopted the government administration and 
established valuable business relations and partnerships. Thus, the Moroland 
drifted further under the control of the Philippine legislature, instead of remaining 
an American responsibility.166      
E. THE COMMONWEALTH ERA (1935-1941) 
In 15 November 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth transition 
government was formally established and Manuel L. Quezon became the 
Commonwealth government’s first president.167 Despite the various petitions and 
protest of the Muslim leaders, the Moro Province became part of the Philippine 
territory. During this period, the Office of the Commissioner of Mindanao and 
Sulu was created with the abolition of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. The 
core national policies were economic development, strengthening of the region’s 
security, and the advancement and integration of the Moros instead of the 
“pacification” and “attraction” policy propagated by the Americans. On 20 
September 1938, President Quezon enunciated the government policy in a 
memorandum issued to the Secretary of Interior which among others authorizes 
the department to give impetus to the work of improving the condition of the  
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people, to develop the resources of the region, and not to recognize the power of 
the datus by protecting the people from the exploitation of their leaders. Quezon 
bluntly said in one of his meetings: 
…The sultans have no more rights than the humblest Moro and that 
under my administration the humblest Moro will be given as much 
protection as any datu under the law, and that his rights will be 
recognized exactly as the rights of a datu will be, and that every 
datu will have to comply with his duties as citizen to same extent 
and in the manner that the humblest Moro is obligated.168 
The Quezon administration viewed Mindanao as a “land of promise” to be 
exploited and developed for national gains. Accordingly, the government 
encouraged the resettling of Christian Filipinos from Luzon and Visayas to the 
region. The turning point of the land settlement issue was the enactment in 1935 
of the “Quirino-Recto Colonization Act,” when the government declared 
settlement as the “only lasting solution to the problem in Mindanao and Sulu.” 
This law opened the floodgates to the massive influx of settlers who were aided 
by development support from the government.169 Similarly, in 1936 another law 
was passed, Commonwealth Act No. 141, which declared all Moro ancestral 
landholdings as public lands.170   
Aside from the loss of territory and system of governance, the Moros were 
not given adequate representation in the national government to advance their 
interests.171 Moreover, under the Commonwealth regime, the Moros were denied 
special privileges guaranteeing protections of Islamic and traditional laws, the 
institution of the sultanate and socio-economic programs.172   
                                            
168 Gowing, “Mandate in Moroland,” 178. 
169 Bertrand, 43. 
170 Satur Ocampo, “Deeper Look at the Moro Problem,” Sun Star Manila, 5 May 2000. 
171 On 10 July 1934, only four Moros out of the 202 delegates were elected to the constitutional 
convention. 
172 Bertrand, 43. 
52 
As the number of Christian Filipinos multiplied, the Moros became a 
minority in many of their strongholds. They began to be treated as second class 
citizens in their own land.173  
Ralph Thomas, in his doctoral dissertation, summarized the condition of 
the Muslim Filipinos under the Commonwealth Government as follows: 
During the Commonwealth period, Muslims were structurally 
integrated. In the political sphere, they participated as well as 
minority could; in the economic sphere, they were assuming a 
secondary and dependent status in their own territory. Political and 
economic changes have increased contacts between Muslim and 
Christian Filipinos. It remained for the future to decide whether 
those relationships would be mutually beneficial and whether 
Muslim Filipinos will be assimilated by the Christian Filipino 
majority.174 
F. JAPANESE OCCUPATION PERIOD (1941-1945) 
The ten-year transition period was cut short when the Philippines was 
occupied by the Japanese. Davao and Sulu were immediately occupied while in 
April 1942, so were Cotabato and Lanao. Guerilla activity was widespread and 
plagued the Japanese authorities until the end of the war. Muslim and Christians 
joined in guerilla units led by the Americans and cooperation between the 
Christians and Moros was the rule.175 Tens of thousands of Moros were either 
enlisted in the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFE) or joined the 
guerilla units to fight the invaders. Violent resistance of numerous Moro groups 
appeared in the form of hit and run tactics, pitched battles, damaging 
ambuscades and damaging retaliation by the Japanese.176 Prominently figured 
guerilla leaders during the occupation were Lt. Salipada Pendatun, Datu Udtog  
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Matalam, Gumbay Piang, Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Rasid Lucman.177 However, 
some Muslims leaders also cooperated with Japanese authorities. They were 
convinced that it would be better to take part in the Japanese war efforts.178 
The end of the war brought significant consequences to the Moroland. The 
rehabilitation produced large amounts of cash, helping to prime the economy 
against dependence on a barter system. Likewise, many Filipino Muslims were 
now able to afford to go on pilgrimages and to build mosques.179 With the 
weapons and ammunitions left behind by both the Americans and Japanese 
forces, the Muslim leaders began to rearm themselves. Steinberg asserts that 
the war  
spawned a totally armed society, and the readiness to resort to 
force has been a disturbing feature of post-independence Philippine 
life. Politicians, businessmen and other elites began to armed 
themselves for more protection against banditry and dissidence. In 
Mindanao, private armies and armed gangs grew rapidly which 
were molded along ethno-religious in the 1970s.180   
G. EARLY YEARS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC (1946-1965) 
Amidst incalculable damage done by the war, Philippine independence 
was granted, as scheduled, on 4 July 1946. Aside from the enormous challenges 
of rehabilitating and reconstruction, the situation in the war-torn state was 
complicated by the insurgent activity of the Communist-dominated Hukbalahap 
(Huks) staged in Central Luzon. The Huks took arms and resorted to terror and 
violence to achieve land reform and gain political power. They finally laid down  
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their arms when Secretary Magsaysay came to the communist rebels with an 
open heart and persuaded most of them that their future lay in peace with 
honor.181 
A hallmark of the Magsaysay program was the relocation of the members 
of the Huk movement who surrendered to resettlement areas in Mindanao. Thus, 
during the administration of Magsaysay, Christian settlement in Mindanao 
proceeded inexorably, with the arrival of thousands of former Huks, ex-soldiers, 
Ilongos, Ilocanos, and Tagalogs. Many of the lands in Mindanao were considered 
public lands because Moros did not have issued titles to claim ownership.  
The massive influx of Christian Filipinos from the North created bitter 
conflicts in land distribution and ownership among Muslims and Christian settlers. 
Christians often had to pay different members of the same family for the same lot 
because some members of the family refused to recognize previous sales. 
Oftentimes, Muslims claimed that Christian settlers would secure a land title 
through government agencies unknown to the Muslim resident. A common 
understanding of the so called Torrens title was particularly slow among the 
Moros for cultural reasons. Land issues have been the singular most critical 
source of Muslim concern. Aijaz Ahmed claims the Moros had owned all the 
lands before colonization, but, in 1981, the Moros owned less than 17 percent 
located mostly in remote and unproductive areas that lack marketing facilities 
and infrastructure. At present, about 80 percent of Muslims are now landless 
farmers.182 
George attributes the economic exploitation of the Muslim region as 
another important factor contributing to Moro unrest.183 American companies and 
the local elites were in the forefront of the exploitation and development of 
Mindanao. Some of the American capitalists who engaged in business ventures 
in Mindanao are Firestone Tire and Rubber Company which was granted 1,000 
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hectares of land in Cotabato for a rubber plantation in 1957. Another is Dole 
Philippines which acquired vast tracts of lands in 1963, for its pineapple 
plantation. Logging and timber corporations obtained hundreds of hectares of 
forest lands and concessions for logging operations184 and these lands often 
included areas being farmed by Muslim communities. The Filipino capitalists took 
the lion’s share of the booming timber, pasture and coconut concessions. Jubair 
claims that many Christian elites not only amassed huge wealth out of the 
region’s rich resources but also “directly contributed to the deprivations and 
sufferings” of the Moros.185 
Moreover, distrust and resentment is prevalent in the public school system 
which was regarded as an agent for instilling Christian values. It is difficult to 
persuade the Moros that the public educational system, with its uniform 
curriculum for both Muslims and Christians, is not designed to separate them 
from their Islamic faith. Owing to this prejudice, Muslim parents often hesitated to 
send their children to public school, insisting that their parochial school be used 
instead.186 Thus, the literacy rate of the Moros is far below that of the Christians, 
and scholars opine that they are behind their fellow citizens.187 
Due to the Philippine government policies, the Moros felt marginalized. 
Resentment intensified as decades of Christian migration completely altered the 
demographic feature of Mindanao completely. The Muslims were reduced from 
76 percent of Mindanao’s population in 1903 to about 23 percent in the 1960s 
and 19 percent in 1990s. In 1913, there were 518,698 Moros and 193,882 non-
Moros or a ratio of nearly three Moros to two Non-Moros. This was completely 
reversed in 1939 during the Commonwealth period in which there were 
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1,489,232 non-Moros compared to 755,189 Moros.188 As a consequence of this 
demographic transformation, the economic and social control of the region 
shifted in favor of the Christians. 
After the Second World War, sporadic bloody confrontations between 
Christians and Muslims rekindled in various localities particularly over land 
disputes and other economic problems. These occasional disturbances of peace 
and order were not organized Muslim uprisings against the new republic. 
However, the Kamlon189 and Tawantawan revolts generated widespread public 
interest and the government decided to investigate the causes of the unrests. 
Consequently, in 1957, Manila organized the Commission on National Integration 
(CNI)190 charged with effecting, in a more rapid and complete manner, the 
economic social, moral and political advancement of non-Christian Filipinos and 
to render real, complete and permanent the integration of all said minorities into 
the body politic. The CNI focused on granting scholarships to Muslims and other 
minorities to study in colleges and universities. Although the government 
believed that with the acquired learning and skills the scholars would bring socio-
economic improvement upon their return to their respective communities, what 
actually transpired was that their education brought awareness of their Islamic 
identity making the educated vocal in their aspiration.191 
This era brought the revival of Islamic consciousness in the Philippines as 
more Muslim Filipinos came in contact with other peoples from Islamic countries. 
Thousands of Muslims took the opportunity to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and 
returned with greater enthusiasm for the universal Islamic brotherhood and 
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greater religious zeal. Arab nationalism has fueled the resurgence of Islam in the 
Southern Philippines. Hundreds of Filipinos were given scholarships to study in 
Islamic theological centers in Egypt and some of them diversified to professional 
schools and even to military institutions. Furthermore, on the international scene, 
Pakistan and Indonesia had become independent nations, and Western 
dependence on oil from Islamic countries began to rise in significance. These 
resulted in a heightened sense of umma and sense of Islamic dignity and pride 
began to prevail.192  
                                            
192 Ibid., 387-388. 
58 
IV. THE BIRTH OF THE CONTEMPORARY MORO REBELLION 
The American administrations pursued “integration” as an essential 
preliminary for Philippine independence while the Filipino nationalists considered 
independence as a preliminary to “integration.” However, the Moros regarded 
integration as assimilation, and assimilation as surrender of their identity. Peter 
Gowing depicts this perception as follows: 
…many Christian Filipinos are persuaded that underneath Muslim 
and Christian Filipinos are the same except that through the 
misfortunes of history the Muslims were somehow left behind in 
their economic, political, social and educational development. The 
whole integration program of the Government seems to revolve 
around the philosophy that if the Muslims are provided with more 
roads, schools, health, facilities, civic centers and industrial plants, 
and if they are instructed in more modern methods of farming or are 
given more scholarships for higher education in Manila or are 
offered jobs in government, then in time they will be “integrated” 
that is, they will resemble the Christian Filipinos. While Muslims do 
in fact want many of these things, they fear this philosophy behind 
the integration program because it is really a philosophy of 
assimilation reflecting the basic contempt for the religious, cultural 
and historical factors upon which they anchor their psychological 
and social identity.193  
From the vantage point of the Manila government, its policies in the 
Southern Philippines were strategies for development and national integration. 
This was in consonance with the migration of northern Christian settlers and the 
opening of businesses into what seemed a relatively underdeveloped south. For 
Muslim locals, these programs represented an imposition of intense colonialism 
in the guise of nationalism.  
As Christian migration to the Moroland was accelerated, conflict over land 
became severe because Moros tended to consider the entire region as theirs by 
right and by their legal standard. Seldom do Moros have Philippine documents to 
establish ownership of their possessions because Christians usually controlled 
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the government bureaucracy in charge of land decisions.194 Land ownership 
disputes became more frequent in Cotabato and Lanao provinces which took on 
religious and “ethnic” overtones. With the influx of Christian settlers, the Moros 
became increasingly alarmed over the dilution of their political power by making 
them a minority in what they felt was their own land.   
Young Muslim intellectuals and students influenced by Nasserite 
nationalism and student radicalism in Manila advocated a militant, anti-state, anti-
Filipino nationalism among Muslim communities.195 Coincident with the 
increasing Christian influx is the growth of Islamic consciousness among the 
Moros. Notable is the effect of foreign missionaries and this awareness is 
displayed in the proliferation of Muslim organizations in the country. Initially these 
organizations were closely linked with politicians, until radical Muslim students 
established their separate organization.  
The Moros were definitely disunited for they remained separated by 
language, custom, and geography. Family and clan structures were also divided 
and divisions are often intensified by political rivalries. Moros were also 
fragmented by wealth, skills, and education. By the end of the 1960s, the 
amalgam of Muslim grievances grew into a full-fledged organized separatist 
movement. Among the immediate critical events that led to the formation of an 
organized front and war of liberation were the Jabidah massacre in 1968, the 
Manili Massacre in 1971, the election of 1971 and the declaration of Martial 
Law.196 
A. SABAH AND OPLAN JABIDAH 
The formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1966 which incorporated 
Sabah as one of its thirteen states generated a territorial dispute between the 
Philippines and Malaysia. The dispute arose from the claim of the Sultan of Sulu 
over Sabah and the Philippine position that North Borneo belonged to the heirs of 
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the Sultan.197 The Philippine claim over Sabah dates back to 1922, 1950, 1962 
and to 1963 when then President Diosdado Macapagal asserted a claim to 
Sabah based on the historic right or legal title clause of the 1935 Philippine 
Constitution.  
When Marcos came to power as President in 1965, he planned the 
groundwork in regaining Sabah as part of Philippine territory and organized a 
clandestine operation code-named Project Merdeka- ostensibly to infiltrate 
Sabah198 and plant rebellion in that island state. The word merdeka is an Indo-
Malayan term meaning “to set free” or simply “freedom.” The plan was to 
organize a rebellion among the Tausogs in Sabah whereupon the Philippine 
military would airlift thousands of troops to Sabah with the overt purpose to 
“protect the rebellious Tausogs from the Malaysians who usurped the Island 
State from the Sultanate of Sulu which is a part of the Philippine sovereignty.”199 
In 1967, under the cloud of complete secrecy, Muslim boys in Sulu were 
recruited with the promise they would be part of an elite unit in the Armed Forces. 
From August to December 1967, about 180 Tausogs and Samals, aged 18 to 30, 
were trained in a secret camp on Simunul Island200 and later moved to 
Corregidor Island for specialized training.201 The intense training included 
mountaineering, survival techniques, and the use of sophisticated communication 
equipment, weapons, and explosives. The recruits performed simulated patrols, 
raids, ambuscades, and infiltration. They specialized in demolition, sabotage, 
assassination as well as jungle survival.    
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In March 1968, a mutiny on the island was reported where 14 Muslims 
were killed and 17 others missing.202 The government never made the cause of 
the execution public. The testimony of the lone survivor, Jibin Arola, made for a 
shocking and chilling revelation. It was claimed that “they were ordered shot 
because they refused to follow orders to attack Sabah.”203 The military 
authorities sensing the negative impact of the leakage of the clandestine plan 
decided to execute the recruits en masse so that no one could tell the story. 
The Jabidah incident was the most important event that sparked the 
Muslim uprising204 and it had two significant political effects. First, the Muslims 
were enraged at the Marcos regime for its low regard for Moro lives. In Sulu, the 
incident had become a personal tragedy. Second, the Malaysian government 
was inflamed by the Machiavellian scheme of the Marcos government which 
sought to reestablish diplomatic relations. Similarly, Malaysian authorities 
responded drastically to the point of placing the country on war footing.  
B. THE MUSLIM INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 
The Jabidah incident reached its nadir when the court martial acquitted 
the accused military personnel. Expectedly, Muslims together with several 
organizations denounced the verdict as a whitewash, and accused the Marcos 
government of criminal intentions against the Moros. Describing the incident as 
the “worst crime of the century,” Muslim militants organized anti-government 
protests and demonstrations. These mass actions already had revolutionary 
undertones.  
Two months after the alleged execution of the Moro recruits, Datu Udtog 
Matalam, one of the most prominent Moro datu politicians and famed guerrilla 
leader against Japan, founded the Muslim (later Mindanao) Independence 
Movement (MIM). With Cotabato as the core of the movement, Matalam accused 
the government of pursuing the “systematic extermination” of the Muslims. 
Declaring independence from the Republic of the Philippines, the MIM manifesto 
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asserted “its desire to secede from the Republic of the Philippines, in order to 
establish an Islamic State205 that shall embody their ideals and aspiration, 
conserve and develop their patrimony, their Islamic heritage under the blessings 
of the Islamic Universal brotherhood.” It called on all Muslims to pursue a jihad to 
change the Moroland into a Darul Islam.206  
The MIM’s creation has evoked fears and apprehension among the 
Christians and in many isolated Christian areas, settlers evacuated to more 
populated Christian centers for safety. Others preferred to stand fast and were 
determined to fight and defend their established productive farms and 
businesses. Similarly, disturbed by the reports that Muslim youths are 
undergoing “months of rigid training” in Malaysia, some Christian political leaders 
began meeting together to take appropriate actions to what they perceived as a 
Moro uprising. Reportedly, in September 1970, seven Christian Ilongo political 
leaders calling themselves “Christian datus” organized the Ilaga (rats) Movement 
which was later led by Feliciano Luces better known as “Toothpick.” 207  
C. VIOLENCE IN COTABATO AND LANAO 
From mid-1970 to 1971, fighting erupted between Muslims and Christians 
in Cotabato and Lanao del Norte where the greatest concentrations of settlers 
were located.208 The Muslim groups, called “Barracudas” and “Blackshirts” were 
organized to counter the Christian armed vigilantes called Ilagas. The Blackshirts 
were allegedly linked with MIM of Datu Matalam and operated in the province of 
Cotabato. The Barracudas were organized by Congressman Ali Dimaporo and  
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operated in the province of Lanao. Meanwhile, the Ilagas started as self-defense 
units to defend Christian communities. However, the Ilagas later degenerated 
into a lawless group as time passed.209 
By the end of 1970, the fighting between these rival groups had caused 
the closure of schools in many areas, disruption of the local economy, many 
casualties, and mass evacuation of thousands of innocent victims. The misery on 
all sides was terrible. The Social Welfare Administration reported that about 
30,000 had abandoned their homes and farms for safer areas.210 
The government deployed additional military and constabulary units to 
restore order by preventing any confrontation between the warring groups. As 
Christians pleaded for protection, town after town were placed under 
Constabulary control. The Moros leaders accused the Constabulary of taking 
sides with the Christians. Muslim leaders suspected that the Ilagas were in 
constant collusion with the constabulary in the area.211 
After Jabidah, the most controversial event was the Manili incident. This 
took place on 19 June 1971 when 65 Muslim men, women, and children were 
executed by Ilagas inside the mosque in Barrio Manili, Carmen, North 
Cotabato.212 This incident is serious and symbolic to the Muslims because it took 
place in a mosque compound. It was viewed as an act of religious humiliation. 
After meeting between the late Libyan Information and Foreign Minister, Saleh 
Bouyasser and Moro leaders, Bouyasser recommended to his government that 
help be extended to the Moro people. In July, representatives of different groups 
of Muslim leaders signed a manifesto in which they vowed before God to 
preserve their communities and lands. Likewise, cries of “genocide” began to be 
heard from Muslim leaders.213 
                                            
209 McAmis, 46. 
210 Ibid., 46. 
211 Gowing, 192.   
212 Che Man, 75. 
213 Ibid., 75-76. 
64 
The armed violence in Cotabato spread into the Lanao provinces. In Wao, 
Lanao del Sur a grenade exploded inside a mosque on 4 July 1971 and over 60 
Moro homes were burned by Ilagas. Thousands of Maranao Muslims were 
evacuated from the mountains to Lake Lanao. Later, Christians in Wao were 
ambushed and homes were burned down in retaliation. As the elections drew 
near, fighting between the Barracudas and Ilagas became intense. This resulted 
in a large-scale evacuation of both Muslims and Christians. By September 1971, 
about 50,000 evacuees were moved to safe areas. Together with the evacuees 
from Cotabato and Bukidnon, over 100,000 evacuees were displaced from their 
homes.214 A month later, 17 soldiers of a 22-man constabulary patrol were killed 
in an ambush by Barracudas in Magsaysay, Lanao del Norte. The following day, 
66 Muslims were killed in a skirmish in the same town.215 
In November in Tacub, Kauswagan a group of unarmed Moro voters 
returning from the special election in Magsaysay were fired upon by government 
troops. About 40 Muslims were killed and about 50 others were wounded with no 
casualties on the government side. An investigation was conducted by the 
National Bureau of Investigation, and in March 1972, the charges were dropped 
against the three civilians and five soldiers for “lack of evidence.” The disposition 
of the remaining 16 soldiers was never reported.216 This incident further 
contributed to the sense of injustice, confirming the feelings among Moros that 
their persecutors enjoyed the support of the establishment. 
The conflict between the warring groups for control of the region 
intensified during the 1971 elections. The result of the 1971 political exercise was 
disastrous for the Muslim elite as political power shifted from Muslims to 
Christians in many parts of the Moroland. For the first time in the Province of 
Cotabato, the City of Cotabato and many Cotabato municipalities elected  
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Christian candidates.217 The leadership changes increased the level of rivalry 
between the Moros and Christian groups, and further intensified the degree of 
violence attracting the attention of Islamic nations abroad.218 
In May 1972, new fighting erupted in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur and about 
5,000, mostly Christians, were evacuated to safe areas. Similarly, fears and 
tensions occurred in the cities of Iligan and Marawi prompting Christian families 
in Marawi to evacuate the city while Muslim families evacuated Iligan. These new 
tensions occurred in areas where Christians and Muslims lived together. The 
conflict spread in Zamboanga del Sur. Reports also had circulated on the 
presence of training camps with foreign instructors in Sulu. The economic 
dislocations and hardships brought about by the evacuations of families of both 
groups further intensified the resentment between the Muslims and Christians, 
and deepened the rift between them.  
D. DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW 
The civil war that was unfolding between the Christian settlers and Moro 
people soon spinned out of control without a sign that the violence would abate. 
Invoking the power under the Philippine constitution, on 21 September 1971, 
Ferdinand Marcos placed the entire country under Martial Law. He accused the 
Moros of instigating rebellion in Mindanao with Christian vigilantes exacerbating 
the peace and security problems in the region and also asserted that 
lawlessness was perpetrated by Philippine Communists.219 He was quoted as 
stating that the lawlessness in the southern Philippines had resulted “… in the 
killing of over 100 civilians and about 2000 armed Muslims and Christians, not to 
mention the more than five hundred thousand of injured, displaced, and  
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homeless persons as well as the great number of casualties among our 
government troops and the paralyzation of the economy of Mindanao and 
Sulu.”220  
With Martial Law, Marcos launched the “September 21 Movement” in 1972 
where he proclaimed the need for a “revolution from the center” where the state 
would initiate fundamental changes in society. This transformation envisioned the 
reduction of the gap between the poor and the rich, “if only for the sake of social 
stability.” In reality, however, the Marcos regime failed to fulfill these goals 
because political order and stability were given priority sacrificing fundamental 
human rights and freedom. 
An advocate of maximum government, Marcos shut down the era of 
pluralistic politics that had existed since the Commonwealth period. Martial Law 
dismantled the democratic structure. Centralized state power increased with the 
abolition of Congress and the emasculation of the Supreme Court. As checks 
and balances melted, the state’s predatory leanings became more conspicuous 
as the state’s interests were equated to that of the Marcos clan and cronies. 
Marcos sustained his hold on power by overplaying the security problem, which 
is a result of his misrule.221 
In some parts of the archipelago, many Filipinos welcomed Martial Law for 
it improved the peace and order situation. Others opposed it for it stifled 
democratic freedom. In Mindanao, a great number of Moros interpreted it as a 
ruse perpetrated to destroy their Muslim faith.222 President Marcos decreed the 
immediate surrender of firearms. This imposition drew sharp resistance for it 
would be tantamount to capitulation and removal of an important status symbol of 
the Moros. Moreover, the Moros feared that their unarmed communities would be 
defenseless against government-backed Ilagas.223 
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The Muslim rebels, the communist insurgents and the moderate 
opposition groups, challenged the legitimacy of the Marcos authoritarian regime. 
With no median available, the imposition of authoritarian rule restricted the 
political activity of the people. The choice was either to accept the new system or 
conduct revolutionary struggle against the regime. Martial law had been an 
exacerbating variable and not the consequence of the Moro revolt.224 The Moros, 
feeling threatened by the political development in Manila, were left with the option 
of resuming armed confrontation with the government. 
Noble articulated the consequences of Martial Law and the concomitant 
government attempts to disarm the Moros, thus: 
Marcos’ declaration of martial law broadened the base of support 
and determined timing of the resort to warfare by the core-group of 
Muslim radicals. Three characteristics of martial law were critical. 
First, the centralization of the regime left power almost exclusively 
in ‘Christian hands: Marcos, his family and associates; ‘technocrats’ 
in Manila; and the military. Second, by restricting the range of 
legitimate political activity the regime left as options only the 
acceptance of the regime and its promises, or anti-regime 
revolutionary activities. Third, the regime’s immediate moves to 
collect guns from civilians meant that compliance removed the 
potential for an eventual resort to force. Thus both Muslims who 
had been frustrated under the old system but had been able to 
channel their frustration into nonviolent political activities, and 
opportunists ready to seize any chance to achieve immediate goals 
– for power, wealth, or pride – became willing to join the radicals.225 
Armed defiance to martial law first occurred a few days before the 21 
October 1972 deadline for the decreed surrender of guns. Fanatical Moro fighters 
calling themselves the “Mindanao Revolutionary Council for Independence,” 
numbering from 500 to 1,000, simultaneously attacked the Mindanao State 
University, the provincial headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary and the 
Pantar Bridge that separates the two Lanao provinces. The rebels gained control 
of the radio station, the school campus, and broadcast inflammatory propaganda 
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impact both at home and abroad stated that “since the Spanish times the 
government of the Philippines had always been against the Muslims and that it is 
necessary to overthrow the government so that there would be no restrictions on 
the practice of Islam.” The battle between the government troops and the 
attacking forces lasted 24 hours, at which time the government reestablished 
control of the city and the uprising ended. The rebels withdrew to the hills and 
took several Christians as hostages who were later killed. When the war was 
over, many Christians left the city.226 
After the Muslim attack in Marawi City, armed violence spread in other 
parts of Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and the Sulu archipelago. In November 
1972, the Moro rebels received sizeable quantities of arms in Jolo and in Tawi-
tawi, and in the succeeding months, full scale attacks were conducted in these 
islands. On 29 November, bloody fighting erupted in Basilan and by January 
1973, the rebels were in control of about 80% of the island. In April 1973, 
violence flared up in the Davao areas, a former area of disturbance. On 07 
February 1974, MNLF forces numbering 5,000 stormed the Jolo town, seat of the 
Sultanate of Sulu. The rebels occupied the town for two days before the 
government troops regained control. This large-scale battle brought the complete 
destruction of the town and economic misery to the Muslim population.  
E. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
Appalled and incensed by the Jabidah incident and inspired by the spirit of 
the MIM, a small group of Muslim intellectuals and students in Manila began 
conspiring and preparing anti-government activities, including guerilla movement 
with the aim to secede the Moroland from the republic.227 The MIM was short 
lived and it was never more than a local movement in Cotabato, but it ignited the 
Moros’ hearts and minds to yearn for independence from the Republic of the 
Philippines. Young Moro students and professionals began to organize and 
conduct anti-government demonstrations and rallies in Manila. From this group 
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emerged the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) whose leaders included Nur 
Misuari of Sulu (then a faculty member of the University of the Philippines) and 
Abul Khar Alonto of Lanao del Sur (then a law student at the San Beda College). 
Barely four months after the Corregidor incident, 92 young Muslims were 
sent to Sabah, Malaysia to undergo “special forces” training which included 
guerilla warfare, intelligence and counter-intelligence, demolition, weapons and 
jungle survival under Malaysian officers. Most of the early trainees were Marxist 
inspired Muslim students committed to organizing a radical separatist movement. 
During their period of training, the radicals formed a small group for a political 
discussion and analysis of Moro history and aspirations of an independent state. 
During this short period, they organized a seven-man Provisional Central 
Committee electing Nur Misuari as Chairman and Abul Khayr Alonto as Vice 
Chairman. This organ was established without the knowledge of Rashid Lucman 
and other leaders who had recruited them because the new leaders wanted to 
disassociate the MNLF from the traditional Muslim leadership and 
organization.228 
Misuari’s vision for Moros rested on the principle of an egalitarian society 
requiring the restructuring of power relations within the Moro community. 
Originally, the MNLF: 
… moved to identify itself with the worldwide Muslim ummah and 
consolidated an important foundation for the Moro vision. As a 
result, the project was able to rely on the social apparatuses that 
supported Islam for generations… drew its strength principally from 
to goals it came to be associated with: Islamization and the 
attainment of social justice. Islam was the unifying concept of Moro 
identity. Without it, there would be little that would bind together the 
13 or so ethno-linguistic groups considered as comprising the Moro 
nation.229 
In an interview with a commander in the MNLF in 1974, he identified three 
factors for the creation of the MNLF: “the Corregidor Massacre, land grabbing, 
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and the disappointment of the broad masses toward government failure to solve 
social, political and most of all, economic problems.”230 Some MNLF leaders 
sympathized with the organization for “national identity” but regarded Jabidah as 
having a “galvanizing effect.” 
Upon the arrival of the first batch of trained guerillas to the Philippines, 
Congressman Rashid Lucman, who made the training arrangement in Malaysia, 
organized the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO). Lucman apparently 
provided the original patronage and external networks for the younger group led 
by Misuari. The BMLO considered itself to be the umbrella organization of all 
liberation forces. Logically, Rashid Lucman became the head of the Supreme 
Executive Council with Macapanton Abbas as secretary, Nur Misuari being 
appointed as head of the military committee in for Sulu, Abul Khayr Alonto the 
head for Ranao, and Udtog Matalam, Jr. for Cotabato.231  
Later, the inevitable happened. Lucman and the radical Misuari broke the 
relationship. Apparently, the ideological differences and the style of Lucman’s 
leadership were the reasons for the split. The breakaway happened when 
Lucman learned of the underground organization, the MNLF, to which Misuari 
channelled funds and logistics. The BMLO’s leadership accused the MNLF of 
betrayal and counter-revolution. At this time, the MNLF had already consolidated 
networks with various militant Muslim organizations in the Philippines, and with 
Qadaffi and Mustapha as the primary benefactors.232 
The MNLF fought primarily to defend Muslim communities against the 
Ilagas and it became a “household name” among the Muslims. At the start, the 
MNLF organized its fighting units covering a particular area, independent from 
the local units already in operation. Its membership soon increased and emerged  
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as the significant voice of the Muslims’ grievances and aspiration. When the 
MNLF came out in the open, it attracted international attention particularly in the 
Muslim world.233 
The MNLF is a loosely knit organization. It is organized with parallel 
political and military structures. Its political organ is composed of a central 
committee of 20 members, a political bureau, a propaganda and intelligence 
bureau, and provincial and barrio committees. A Chairman, who is selected from 
among its members and provincial committees, heads the Central Committee. 
The military component, Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), is headed by the field 
marshals under but not directly supervised by the central committee. At the 
provincial level, the rebel army is also led by a field marshal and under him are 
zone commanders in designated municipalities. The rebel army provided six 
months training for its recruits, which included political education. 
The provincial revolutionary committees were organized in different Moro 
provinces and were divided into three major groups: Sulu, Kotawato, and Ranao. 
The groupings represented the three major ethno-cultural groups: Tausugs, 
Maguindanaos and Maranaos. The provincial committees were tasked to 
consolidate the existing Moro fighters within their respective areas, to recruit and 
train fighters, and carry out the war.234  
Under the leadership of the MNLF, the various Muslim ethno-linguistic 
groups attained a measure of unity. Historical disunity has defined the Moros as 
Maranao, Maguindanao and Tausog: who were unable to bond together for a 
common cause. The individual’s level of support for the MNLF was dependent 
upon which ethno-linguistic group one was connected with, or to which clan or 
family one was related. Moros are divided into locally-educated youth, foreign 
trained and educated Islamic radicals. This diversity in the Front’s membership 
resulted in unclear ideology which ultimately spoiled the growth of Muslim unity in 
future dealings with the Philippine authorities. Similarly, the diverging ideology 
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and objectives led to the eventual breaking up of the front.235 The more secular 
MNLF and other splinter groups made concessions and compromised with the 
government, while the more radical members later embraced the fundamental 
Islamic line. 
The Muslim secessionist conflict reached its peak in 1974. Estimates of 
armed men actively fighting have ranged from 5,000 to 30,000. One rebel 
estimated that about 55 percent of the Moro population supports the MNLF, 15 
percent supports the government, and the remainder is neutral.236 In 1975, there 
were about 1.8 million Muslims in Mindanao. 
F. THE MNLF LEADERSHIP 
The leadership of the Muslim secessionist movement has been provided 
primarily by the Moro National Liberation Front and its Central Committee was 
formally formed in Libya in 1974 comprising about thirteen members. The MNLF 
leadership started with three prominent Moro student activists – Nur Misuari, 
Abul Khayer Alonto and Hashim Salamat.  
Nur Misuari, chairman of the central committee, is a former political 
science instructor at the University of the Philippines. Misuari grew up in extreme 
poverty and was granted a college scholarship. He became the embodiment of 
campus charisma through his campus activities particularly as a debater. He 
became one of the founding fathers of the Kabataan Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) 
or KM237 and became the Chairman of the Western Mindanao sector of the youth 
organization. The KM became widely known as a Marxist front organization and it 
was the first opposition group to be outlawed upon declaration of Martial Law.238 
Although Misuari intensively studied Marx, he was unable to rise above his 
traditionalist religious background. He became a converted anti-capitalist on a 
socialist mission. To resolve the dialectics of communism and Islam, Misuari‘s 
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group argued that everything Chairman Mao had proposed, the Prophet 
Mohammad had already proposed. Misuari and his group embraced Islam and 
chose to preach their ideology in the name of Islam because many of the Moros 
were too strongly rooted in Islamic faith to accept the ungodly tenets of Marxism. 
In another aspect, they maintained their radical thoughts and ardently studied 
Maoist tactics and techniques.239 
In 1967, Misuari became instrumental behind the organization of the 
Philippine Nationalist league and the editor of its official organ, the Philippine 
Muslim News. At this stage of the organization, he could not ignore the need for 
political support and resources to advance action programs. Consequently, he 
became an associate of Congressman Rascid Lucman, an influential political 
boss of the Lanao province and began building his network among the traditional 
leaders of the region. Despite the support of the Muslim elites, Misuari’s visions 
of justice for Filipino Muslims involved the Marxist principles of egalitarianism 
which entail the restructuring of the power relations in Muslim society by 
eliminating the traditional leaders. Having found a patron, Misuari took the 
opportunity to undergo the first batch of guerilla training program in Malaysia. 
While abroad, he cultivated the significant contacts to organize the MNLF as an 
underground organization in 1972. Misuari married Desdemona Tan who is a 
niece of the wife of Salih Utulalum, a long time leader in Sulu.240 
Misuari organized the MNLF central committee around university men, 
with little participation from the field commanders left fighting in Mindanao. 
Yussop Abbas, a theology student, was given the education portfolio, and Hatimil 
Hassan, a student of medicine in Cairo, was designated as the “minister of 
health.” Assad Asani, a former government official, was placed in charge of the 
“information ministry” while Uztadz Abijari, who was studying in Mecca, was 
named the head of the “Supreme Court.” Appointed as the legal advisers were 
Abdul Hamid Lucman, a former judge and Hadji Hassan Jamil, a lawyer.241 A 
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five-man junta was also organized constituting Yossop Abbas, Gaipur Ali, a 
student in Islamic law and jurisprudence, and history and Abdul Baki Abubakar, 
along with Misuari and Hashim Salamat. 
The vice-chairman of the central committee was Abdul Khar Alonto, a co-
founder of the MNLF. He is a member of a known Maranao family and was a 
former law student at San Beda College in Manila, and was elected vice mayor of 
Marawi City in 1971. He stayed in Mindanao and was a field marshal in 
command of the central Mindanao based in Lanao. Like Alonto, tough local 
leaders, Usman Sali and Al Caluang, were part of the Committee of Thirteen. 
Usman was Sulu’s most powerful leader figure. When martial law was declared 
he quickly became a field marshal of the MNLF. Al Caluang, a field marshal, was 
popular and one of the more prominent commanders of the NNLF.242  
Another famous MNLF leader was Hashim Salamat, who later broke away 
from the Front because he favored autonomy over independence. Salamat and 
Alonto, together with Misuari, were among the first batch of Muslim radicals to 
covertly undergo training in Malaysia. Like Alonto, Salamat came from an affluent 
family and scions of a royal family. Corruption among traditional politicians in 
Cotabato, who were his relatives, caused Salamat to strongly dislike them, and 
he longed for changing the system.243  
G. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION 
When bloody incidents made news in the late 1960s, many Islamic 
countries were alarmed about the plight of the Muslim Filipinos. As reports of 
violence swelled, they began to believe that the Moros were being persecuted. 
Their empathy was further intensified when Filipino Muslim radicals sent out 
appeals for support. Various Islamic organizations made pleas to the United 
Nations Organization to conduct investigations concerning the charges of 
genocide. 
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In particular, the Manili incident caught the attention of Libyan leader Col. 
Muammar Qaddafi.244 Moved by the gruesome event, Qaddafi warned that Libya 
“will be compelled to shoulder its responsibilities towards the four million Muslims 
in the Philippines.” His ambassador to the UN insisted that the world body 
intervene to stop the senseless killings of Muslim Filipinos. Since this incident, 
the prospect of peace in the southern Philippines became firmly linked to Libya 
and other countries belonging to the Organization of Islamic Conference245 
(OIC). 
Malaysia appears to have provided logistical support to the Moro rebels 
not so much because of Kuala Lumpur’s commitment to religious fraternity, but in 
response to the Philippines secret military plan to invade the contested territory 
of Sabah in the late 1960s. Kuala Lumpur sharply reacted to the Jabidah incident 
by promising the Moro leaders that, “they will train young Muslims from the 
Philippines on ‘special forces’ courses and they will give 10,000 arms with 
continuous supply of ammunitions and the necessary logistical support for 
10,000 well-trained boys.”246 At the federal level, the government of Malaysia 
aided the Muslim movement as a means of forcing Manila to abandon its Sabah 
claim. At the state level, Tun Datu Mustapha Harun, the chief Minister of Sabah, 
purportedly consented to the MNLF sanctuary and armed assistance in terms of 
training, supply, and communications purposes.247 In 1969, 90 young Muslim 
Filipinos sailed to North Borneo for military training.248 
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The Malaysian Government denied that it gave support to the Moros. In 
Islamic conferences, it had adopted the facade of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of the Philippines but it did not stop Mustapha from providing 
support to the Moro secessionists, perhaps fearing that Sabah would secede 
from the federation.249  
Libya’s support and intervention was primarily inspired by its commitment 
to Islamic brotherhood and the Quranic obligation to relieve the persecution of 
the ummah. Libya is believed to have provided about $1 million to cover the 
expenses of some 300 Muslim recruits who were trained in Sabah in the early 
1970s. After the declaration of martial law, Libya began to deliver funds, 
weapons, and other equipment to the MNLF under the leadership of Nur Misuari. 
The MNLF received about $35 million from Libya and the other 0IC countries 
between 1972 and 1975. Libya also attempted to persuade member states of the 
OIC to impose sanctions against the Marcos regime although with little success. 
However, Qaddafi’s full support of the MNLF was later moderated under 
pressure from the OIC countries. Later, it played the role of mediator between 
Manila and the MNLF. The Tripoli agreement, signed in December 1976, 
provided for an autonomous government in the predominantly Muslim provinces 
of Mindanao.250  
Saudi Arabia also played a mediating role in the Mindanao conflict since 
1973 and provided both funds and sanctuary to different secessionist groups 
such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Bangsa Moro Islamic 
Liberation Organization (BMILO). Through agencies such as the Muslim World 
League and Darul Ifta, Saudi Arabia granted contributions to a number of 
projects in the Muslim areas of Mindanao. In 1980, when the Marcos regime 
failed to satisfactorily implement the 1976 Tripoli agreement in good faith, Saudi 
Arabia temporarily halted its oil supply to the Philippines-an effective tool for 
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pressuring Manila to abide by the accord, as about 40 percent of the Philippine’s 
oil requirement came from the Kingdom.251   
Unlike many conventional revolutionary movements, the MNLF Central 
Committee operated outside the Mindanao. The primary function of the leaders 
was cultivating foreign support. It left the task of fighting and organizing to local 
leaders. It was a significant accomplishment of the Central Committee that the 
rebel organization continued to receive funds and other logistic support from 
Muslim countries and to obtain the recognition of the OIC.252 
Misuari’s MNLF was also provided support from Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini 
who said, “the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran would not be complete until 
the oppressed Bangsa Moro Muslims in the southern Philippines won their 
victory.” In November 1980, the MNLF was bestowed embassy status and the 
accompanying official recognition by Iran. To demonstrate its support to the Moro 
struggle, Iran cut off its oil supply to the Philippines, although only for a short 
period.253 
Generally, Indonesia’s policy have been non-interference and unlike, 
Malaysia, it did not support the Moro secessionist movement, although it tried to 
end the conflict. There were reports, however that the governor of Makasar 
provided support. Officially, Indonesia had been endorsing autonomy, not 
independence.254 Their refusal to aid the rebels was the result of its experience 
with militant movements in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, Indonesia does not 
consider itself an Islamic state in the sense that Islam is not constitutionally 
considered as the religion that provides the ruling principles for the nation’s 
policy. At the Islamic conferences, Indonesia consistently supported the 
Philippine government and asked Libya not to interfere in the conflict.255 
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The MNLF successfully secured moral and material assistance, with its 
commitment to Islamic ideology and revolutionary struggle which formed its basic 
link to Islamic countries pursuing a similar vision. Thus, with strong foreign 
support, the MNLF emerged as the leading revolutionary front of the Muslim 
Filipinos. Among the majority of Moros, the MNLF articulated their aspirations for 
self determination and independence.256  
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V. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES AND PEACE PROCESSES 
A. THE MARCOS PERIOD (1972 - 1986) 
Initially Marcos adopted a “total war” policy against the MNLF and related 
groups deploying more than half of the AFP in Mindanao and Sulu.. The conflict 
escalated into large-scale conventional warfare. In February 1974, Southcom 
conducted a full scale attack on the MNLF rebels who had taken control of Jolo in 
the biggest battle of the civil war in Mindanao. Cemcom hit the Bangsa Moro 
Army (BMA) in Cotabato.257 The Moro rebels tied up over 50 battalions of the 
AFP. From 1972-76, the bitter warfare waged by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front had resulted in approximately 
50,000-60,000 deaths. Official government figures reveal that between 500,000 
to million were considered internally displaced persons (IDP) and 200,000 sought 
refuge in the Malaysian state of Sabah.258   
Marcos portrayed himself as a loyal and dependable American ally who 
needed continued U.S. support in the battle against insurgency. The growth of 
military assistance after 1972 shored up the military expenditures nearly nine 
times from 608 million pesos that year to 5.3 billion pesos in 1977. The military’s 
share of the national budget practically doubled to 22.6 percent in 1977. The 
Philippine military swelled to more than 113,000 in 1976 from just 35,000 in the 
early 1960s. Meanwhile, the Philippine police was reconstituted under centralized 
control and carried out counterinsurgency functions alongside with paramilitary 
forces.259  
Later in the mid-1970s, the military response was accompanied by social 
and economic packages in an effort to win some of the MNLF supporters to the 
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refugees and a Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction of Mindanao was 
constituted to rebuild areas destroyed by the conflict. To encourage and boost 
economic activities, he further created the Southern Philippines Development 
Administration.260 Arabic instruction was allowed in some public schools in 
predominantly Muslim provinces, university scholarships for Muslims were 
expanded, a Code of Philippine Muslim Personal Law was promulgated which 
established Shariah courts as part of the national system of courts, the Philippine 
Amanah Bank was created to provide financial assistance to Muslim 
entrepreneurs on generous terms, and Muslim title to ancestral lands was 
recognized by law. Also, the regime expanded Muslim appointees to government 
positions.261 
The tremendous pressure of the huge costs associated with enlarged 
military combat actions and the likelihood of sanctions by oil producing countries 
forced the Marcos regime into considering a negotiated settlement with the 
Muslim secessionists. In August 1973, Marcos allowed the visit of the delegates 
from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia to the Southern Philippines to 
investigate the ‘the plight of Muslims living in the Philippines.’ The team 
concluded that political settlement could bring a cessation of the dispute and not 
the military and socio-economic approaches being undertaken by the regime.  
Consequently, at the 5th ICFM in June 1974, the body called upon the 
Marcos regime to stop all actions that resulted in the killing of Muslims and the 
destruction of their property and places of worship. The OIC pressed upon the 
Philippine government “to find political and peaceful solution through negotiation 
with Muslim leaders, particularly with the representatives of the Moro National 
Liberation Front in order to arrive at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino 
Muslims within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Philippines.”262 Indonesia’s influential position in the OIC was significant in 
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convincing the conferees to agree that secession is not the solution to the Muslim 
insurgency.263 Similarly, the OIC urged the Philippine authorities to hold direct 
negotiations with the MNLF chairman Nur Misuari to commence the political 
process of ending the Mindanao problem. The OIC nonetheless denied the 
MNLF a belligerent status (same as that of the Palestinian Liberation Front).264 
In the end, the Philippine government was compelled to negotiate. It could 
not disregard or crush the rebellion in the Southern Philippines, and it could not 
isolate the Front from its foreign Islamic supporters. The series of Islamic 
Conferences generally passed resolutions which were considered reasonable to 
the Philippine government and the Front. The resolutions restrained the MNLF 
from pressing its goal to secede. “The diplomatic restraint was also a clear signal 
to the Philippine government that the conference would not interfere with the 
internal affairs of another sovereign state.”265 The OIC exerted sustained 
pressure on the Marcos government to negotiate autonomy demands with the 
MNLF along with giving resistance.266 The “Committee of Four,” appointed by the 
Foreign Ministers’ Conference to oversee negotiations, recommended that 
genuine autonomy was necessary in achieving justice for Muslim Filipinos.267 
In 1975, Marcos built -up the government’s diplomatic efforts by sending 
delegations to include special representative Imelda Marcos to Libya, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia and Algeria. The Philippines established friendly relations with 
Islamic countries and opened its embassy in Saudi Arabia, the United Emirates, 
Iran, Algeria, Lebanon and Kuwait. A well-planned diplomatic initiative was 
initiated aimed at stopping the flow of external support to the Muslim rebels. 
Likewise, the Philippines allied with the Arab cause in the United Nations to 
 from the occupied territories. This action was carried persuade Israel to withdraw
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out to win the friendship of the Arabs in order not to disrupt the supply of oil in the 
Philippines and to exert influence by stopping foreign aid to the Muslim rebels in 
Mindanao.268 
The government efforts apparently had some success since there was a 
significant decrease in the supply of arms to the rebels. This event jibed the 
defeat of Tun Mustapha by Dato' Harris Salleh in the Sabah election in the 
middle of 1975.269 In the field, local ceasefires were forged and defections 
increased. Under the policy of attraction, key rebel leaders were offered amnesty 
and other socio-economic incentives as well as government positions allowing 
them to give up arms with dignity. Some of those who surrendered were Amelil 
“Ronnie” Malaguiok, Chairman of the Kutawato (Cotabato) Revolutionary 
Committee, and Abdul Hamid Lukman, member of the MNLF Central Committee 
and Misuari’s legal adviser in Jeddah.270 
Meanwhile, the series of Islamic Conferences generally passed 
resolutions which were considered reasonable to the Philippine government and 
the Front. The resolutions restrained the MNLF from pressing its aim to secede. 
“The diplomatic restraint was also a clear signal to the Philippine government that 
the conference would not interfere with the internal affairs of another sovereign 
state.”271 The OIC exerted sustained pressure on the Marcos government to 
negotiate autonomy demands with the MNLF along with giving resistance.272 The 
“Committee of Four,” appointed by the Foreign Ministers’ Conference to oversee 
negotiations, recommended that genuine autonomy was necessary in achieving 
justice for Muslim Filipinos.273 
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A series of conferences between representatives of the Philippine 
government and the Islamic Conference culminated in the visit by Imelda 
Marcos, the president’s wife, to Tripoli in November 1976 and negotiations 
involving the Philippines, the Islamic Conference, and MNLF officials in Tripoli in 
December. Consequently, under the auspices of the powerful Organization of 
Islamic Conference, the Tripoli Agreement was signed by the two contending 
parties in conflict on 23 December 1976. 
The negotiation and signing of the Tripoli Agreement is by itself a 
remarkable diplomatic triumph for the MNLF as it accorded them belligerent state 
status. The Philippine government also benefited enormously from the 
agreement as it provided a much needed breathing spell to recover from the 
consequences of the Mindanao war on the economy. The government was also 
able to bring home the Moro issue from the Middle East as well.274 
The Tripoli Agreement was acclaimed as a significant development in the 
search for peaceful resolution of the southern Philippine dispute. A vital part of 
the accord was the separate ceasefire agreement between both parties that 
immediately put a halt to the war. The ceasefire was to be coordinated and 
observed by a committee comprised of representatives of the Philippine 
government, the MNLF and the OIC. The three salient features of the agreement 
are the following:275 
• The establishment of the autonomous region in the Southern 
Philippines composed of 13 provinces and all villages and cities 
therein within the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic 
of the Philippines; 
• The agreement in principle of the powers of the autonomous region 
in local and regional affairs, especially on those that touch on the 
religion and culture of Islam as lived by the Moro peoples. A mixed 
committee is to be established composed of the official 
representatives of the Philippine Government and the MNLF with 
the participation of the Quadripartite Commission created by the 
rpose. This committee is tasked with hashing  out the OIC for the pu                                            
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details of all the agreements in principle as contained in the Tripoli 
Agreement; and 
• The insertion by the Philippine Government of the provision that will 
subject the said agreement to the constitutional processes of the 
Republic of the Philippines.  
Provisionary arrangements for the peace settlement included autonomy 
for the Moros in thirteen provinces.276 The autonomous government has the 
prerogative to establish courts and an administrative and educational system 
under Philippine law. Moreover, the autonomous government is structured to 
have a legislative assembly and executive council, an administrative system, and 
representation in the national government. Meanwhile, Muslim security forces 
would maintain peace and order in the designated autonomous areas while the 
national government would be responsible for foreign policy and national 
defense.277 
However, the euphoria of peace was short lived because within a few 
months after signing the accord, both parties began accusing each other of 
breaching the provisions of the agreement. The stalemate arose due to 
disagreements over the meaning of autonomy and the MNLF insisted that the 13 
provinces at once be proclaimed a single autonomous unit. On the other hand, 
Marcos maintained that certain “constitutional processes” had to be satisfied, 
including the conduct of a plebiscite in affected areas, because the majority of 
the inhabitants in some provinces were not Muslim. On March 1977, Imelda 
Marcos hurried to Libya to seek Qadaffi’s help and it was agreed to declare the 
thirteen provinces part of the autonomous region, appoint a provisional 
government, and hold a plebiscite to deal with administrative details.278 Thus, on 
25 March 1977, Marcos issued Proclamation 1628 establishing regional  
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autonomy in the Southern Philippines and created a provisional Regional 
Government that was mandated to prepare the constitutional processes required 
for the full operation of the agreed autonomous regional government.279 
On 17 April 1977, a referendum on autonomy was held, with an 
overwhelming majority rejecting the merger of Region 9 and 10 into one 
autonomous region. Several other proposals that were dismissed by the 
electorates were naming the autonomous region the Bangsamoro Islamic 
Region, establishing the regional flag, official language and courts, and 
empowering the MNLF to organize separate security forces.280 It was a 
resounding defeat for the MNLF because the Christians dominated the area 
numerically, economically and politically. The referendum understandably 
rebuffed any move to shift political power to the Muslims, particularly the MNLF. 
The MNLF protested the conduct of the poll exercise and it was boycotted 
by a majority of the Muslims. Subsequently, the Tripoli Agreement ended in 
deadlock amid mutual allegations. Misuari accused the Marcos regime of 
unlawful actions including violations of the ceasefire, dividing the area into two 
autonomous regions and the demilitarization of the region.281 At the 8th ICFM 
held in Tripoli, the MNLF was bestowed observer status by the OIC but failed to 
convince the body to impose economic sanctions against the Philippines. The 
foreign ministers expressed displeasure over the outcome of the agreement, but 
the ICFM simply urged the Quadripartite Commission to continue pursuing 
mediation efforts.  
1977 was a breaking point in the history of the MNLF as it entered an era 
of disarray characterized by factional infighting and weakening of mass support. 
During this period, the Bangsa Moro Army was a depleted force as many had 
been killed and many others sought refuge in Sabah or in the Middle East while 
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37,000 availed themselves of the government’s amnesty program. Of 
significance was the emergence of a split in the MNLF leadership. The division 
was reportedly attributed to personal differences and ambitions, diverse positions 
on the issue of autonomy and independence, and over the question of alternative 
strategies pursuing negotiations outside the Tripoli Agreement.282 Similarly, 
insiders denounced that Misuari became inflexible and too domineering in the 
decision making process.283 Others accused him of being corrupt and the MNLF 
of fast evolving toward a Marxist-Maoist orientation.  
The MNLF Central Committee began to divide along ethno ethno-linguistic 
lines. Forcing the division were ex-Senator Salipada Pendatun, a Maguindanao 
and ex-Representative Rashid Lucman, a Maranao. In Jeddah on 26 December 
1977, Hashim Salamat declared an “Instrument of Takeover” of the MNLF 
leadership which was supported by both Pendatun and Lucman. Misuari 
countered by purging Abul Khar Alonto and Hashim Salamat.  
Supported by the ethnic Maguindanaos, the Salamat faction became a 
separate organization named the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which 
advocated a more moderate and reconciliatory approach toward the government. 
Salamat, an Islamic former scholar at the Cairo University, wanted to stress the 
Islamic orientation in the struggle for autonomy and self determination. Salamat 
shaped the MILF into an organization advancing the creation of a genuine 
Islamic state in the Southern Philippines governed completely by the dictates of 
the Qur’an.284  
The MILF underscores the need for a strong autonomous government in a 
Bangsamoro homeland and defined its goal as “the establishment of a 
democratic system of government with equal representation in the executive, 
legislative and judicial departments following the principle of elections…centering  
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on self determination, except in foreign affairs and national defense.” His 
leadership enjoyed the support of more fundamentalist Muslims particularly from 
his tribe – Maguindanaos.285  
The Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) is the military organization 
of the MILF.286 The Chairman of the MILF commands the BIAF. The area of 
operations of the BIAF mainly covers the central and western regions of 
Mindanao. The MILF has swelled from about 6,000 in 1990 to a peak of 15,000 
in 1999.287 
Similarly, Abul Khayr Alonto, Vice-Chairman of the MNLF, and his 
followers gave up arms, in March 1978. He was removed from the MNLF Central 
Committee because he did not favor Misuari’s maneuvering for total 
independence.288 In 1982, Abdul Khayr Alonto became the Speaker of the 
Region XII Assembly. He published a booklet, addressed to President Marcos, 
which censured the operations of the autonomous governments and 
recommended the merger of the two regions and the granting of ‘a meaningful 
autonomy’. Alonto was enlisted into the Marcos political party ticket for the 1982 
Regional Assembly election.289  
With the removal of Salamat and Alonto, Dimasangkay Pundato, 
Chairman of the Ranao Revolutionary Committee, was promoted to Vice-
Chairman of the MNLF. However, in March 1982 Pundato announced the 
formation of the MNLF-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG). Pundato’s breakaway from 
the MNLF was the result of a dispute with Misuari over the latter’s reversion to 
MNLF’s original goal of secession and independence.290 Like most of the Moro 
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groups, the MNLF-RG aimed to create an Islamic community in the Muslim 
provinces through the gradual implementation of the Sharia. The Reformists 
group is mostly comprised of traditional Maranao aristocrats with a secular 
education. Pundato went further by seeking support from the United States for 
the peaceful resolution of the Mindanao dispute.291 During the Aquino regime, 
Pundato came home from exile in 1987 and eventually became the executive 
director of the Office for Muslim Affairs (OMA).292 
The Arab countries were split on their support to the rebel groups. The 
MNLF’s main sources of aid were Libya, Syria, Iran and the OIC.293 The MILF 
received support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Kuwait and Malaysia. On 
the other hand, the MNLF-RG obtained support from Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. 
Starting in 1977, international support to the MNLF decreased. However, the OIC 
continued to support Misuari’s leadership.294  
Meanwhile, at the 15th ICFM in 1984, the foreign ministers reaffirmed their 
commitment to respect the territorial integrity of the Philippines and continued to 
refuse support for Misuari’s separatist position.295 Similarly, at the second 
Bangsa Moro Congress in 1986, the MNLF leadership conceded to the pressure 
and gave up the demand for secession and independence.296  
Marcos adopted a two-prong strategy, i.e., using conventional military 
force to stop the rebellion and employing non-military measures mostly aimed in 
bringing economic reforms that would benefit the masses. However, despite all 
efforts to promote the socio-economic and political well being of the Moros, the 
conflict remained. It was observed that the Moros masses accrue few real 
                                            
291 Vitug and Gloria, 35. 
292 Vitug and Gloria, 38. 
293 In 1985, Misuari’s MNLF faction reportedly forms close relations with Iran. Viewing this relationship 
a potential threat to U.S. interests, the State Department and the Pentagon opened up lines of 
communication with the MNLF Reformist Group. Pundato was invited to Washington in 1985.  
294 May, 58. 
295 Lela Garner  Noble, “Mindanao: A Perspective from Philippine Frontier,” a paper for a conference 
on Southeast Asian Studies and International Business Northern Illinois University, 31 May – June 1983, 4.  
296 May, 59. 
90 
benefits and little was achieved to alleviate the fears of Muslims, and that real 
motive was to benefit the Christian settlers. Similarly, the military campaigns 
offset the limited economic gains.  
The Tripoli agreement was not fully implemented because of the lack of 
the commitment from the Marcos regime and the unrealistic demand of the 
MNLF.297 Thomas Mckenna observes the agreement  
provided a much needed breathing spell from the economic drain of 
the war and considerable diplomatic pressure for settlement coming 
from the Middle East. It is doubtful that President Marcos ever 
sincerely intended to implement the agreement as signed.298  
Nonetheless, the Tripoli Agreement became the benchmark for future 
negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro rebels. Violent 
encounters continued but at a lower intensity than in 1972-76, and negotiations 
were not revived until Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency in 1986. 
At the national scene, Marcos’ dictatorial rule provoked mass discontent 
throughout the Philippines, expressed in the 1980s by large demonstrations, 
general strikes and a rapid growth of support for the insurgents. At the same 
time, by clinging to a monopoly of political power, Marcos had alienated his 
political and economic rivals. In February 1986, he was overthrown by a 
combination of popular uprising and military revolt.  
B. AQUINO PERIOD (1986-1992) 
On February 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino came to power on the 
wave of anti-Marcos protests triggered by the assassination of her husband, 
former Senator Benigno Aquino, the political archrival of Marcos. She had run for 
election and soon after her inauguration, her administration restored a system of 
electoral democracy. Likewise, she released 500 political prisoners and granted 
amnesty to the communist guerrillas in attempt to end the insurgency.299 A new 
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constitution was drawn up in 1987, by a commission whose members were 
appointed by the President. Under her administration, the media restrictions were 
relaxed, and the number of NGOs mushroomed. 
The “People Power” revolution of 1986 opened another possibility for 
genuine compromise among the different rebel groups. Various Muslim groups 
joined with the anti-Marcos forces in support of the regime change. “A 
communiqué issued after a general meeting of the MNLF leadership in Mindanao 
in March 1985, for example, reported a resolution that mujahideen were ready ‘to 
establish channels of communication and cooperation with opposition groups so 
as to hasten the downfall of the Marcos regime.’”300 This commonality of 
interests is instrumental to the new climate of trust that would allow negotiations 
to begin.301 In her pronouncement on 2 October 1987 on the peace policy in the 
Southern Philippines, President Aquino pushed an approach that was “not just 
political but (involves) all aspects of all aspects of development; not just the 
MNLF but all Muslim Filipinos; not just Muslim Filipinos but all of Mindanao.”302  
Following the takeover of the Aquino government, talks with Nur Misuari began. 
Disregarding protocol, President Aquino personally met Nur Misuari on 5 
September in Jolo to dramatize the government’s sincere effort in resolving 
peace in Mindanao. This historic event led the warring parties to agree to halt 
hostilities303 and engage in dialogue with the Tripoli agreement and the regional 
autonomy as the starting point. In January 1987, the government and the MNLF 
reached a ceasefire. Under pressure from the OIC, the MNLF abandoned its aim 
of total independence for Muslim regions and accepted the offer of autonomy. At 
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the end of 1987, the Aquino administration organized the Regional consultative 
Commission (RCC) in an attempt to continue dialogue between the two parties in 
preparation for the constitutionally autonomy legislation for Mindanao.304 
However, by mid-1987, the MNLF abandoned the negotiations as both 
parties could not agree on the territorial scope of the autonomy. The MNLF 
demanded fourteen provinces while the Philippine government insisted that only 
five provinces with a Muslim majority should be considered. Meanwhile, 
breaches of ceasefire became frequent and armed encounters persisted 
between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other Moro insurgents, like the 
MILF. Misuari went into exile and the negotiations eventually collapsed.305 
The Philippine government pushed ahead with plans for Muslim autonomy 
without the MNLF’s cooperation. In February 1987, the New Philippine 
Constitution was ratified and provided for the inclusion of a clause in the new 
constitution recognizing autonomy of Muslim Mindanao.306 The Aquino regime 
worked with the some traditional Muslim leaders to provide for the creation of an 
“Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao” (ARMM).307 Moreover, the new 
Constitution also mandates that “the creation of the autonomous region shall be 
effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in 
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and 
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the 
autonomous region.”308  
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The autonomy law was passed by the Philippine Congress and on 19 
November 1989, a plebiscite was held in thirteen provinces and nine cities to 
decide which of these areas would join the autonomous region. Rejecting the poll 
exercise, Nur Misuari vigorously urged five million Muslims to boycott the poll and 
threatened to reignite the armed struggle for Moro secession. He criticized the 
autonomy law for violating the full autonomy for the Muslims stipulated under the 
Tripoli Agreement and claimed that they were not included in drawing up the 
autonomy law. The MNLF officially resumed its armed insurgency in February 
1988, but little fighting resulted.309 
The ratification of the ARMM opened another opportunity for the traditional 
leaders to reestablish political power. Many who joined the insurgency were 
attracted to cooperate with the government after the Tripoli accord. These 
distributions of power have benefited the Moro elite from the representation in 
formal political institutions and related sources of enrichment.310  
The conduct of the plebiscite was relatively peaceful and voter turn out 
was moderate. As expected, those living in predominantly Christian areas 
rejected the law and only four provinces with no cities voted to join in the 
ARMM.311 The four-province ARRM was officially installed on 6 November 1990 
constituting the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. 
The first election for all elected offices, governor, vice governor, and 21-man 
legislative assembly, was held on 9 July 1990 with Zacaria Candao, a 
Maguindanao and a legal representative of the MNLF elected as Regional 
Governor. Benjamin Loong, a Tausug, was voted the Vice Governor. Candao 
attempted to find a measure to surmount intertribal differences, mediate family 
feuds and raise money for the region’s coffer. Accordingly, the representatives of  
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the legislative assembly were reasonably distributed comprising three 
representatives from Tawi -Tawi, and six each from Sulu, Lanao del Sur and 
Maguindanao. 
This political exercise regularized and completed the 1987 constitutional 
steps in establishing the autonomous region in the southern Philippines.312 The 
functions of the departments of public works, labor and employment, local 
government, social services and other bureaus were moved to the regional 
government. The national authorities empowered the regional government to 
initiate and seek direct foreign investments for socio-economic growth and 
development, but the lack of Moro unity and commitment hindered the ARMM 
from functioning effectively as a legitimate governing organ.313 Overall, the 
establishment of the ARMM afforded some institutional autonomy to the Muslim 
areas but was short of satisfying Misuari. 
Similarly, the enactment of the Philippine Local Government Code of 1991 
provided greater autonomy and responsibility to develop a socio-economic base 
through regional initiatives and the internal generation of revenues. In addition, 
the passage of the Foreign Investment act opened up previously restricted areas 
of the economy and permitted 100 percent foreign equity in strategic industries 
such as mining.314  
In sum, the failure of the political settlement strategy to resolve the conflict 
could be attributed to the nature of the civil-military relations during this period. 
The Aquino government, despite massive popular support, was politically 
unstable. The executive branch was weakened from the intimidation of several 
coup plots. Accordingly, the inability of the Aquino regime to control the military 
gave the insurgents a reason to abandon the peace talks and resume hostilities. 
Similarly, the return of the traditional oligarchic legislature obstructed the  
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passage of substantive and meaningful reforms needed to address the root 
causes of social unrest. Although Congress enacted a land reform law, most of 
its provisions protected the interests of the landowner.315 
In the final analysis, the Aquino administration was a transitional period, 
restoring the political structures and processes of democracy and providing the 
groundwork upon which further socio-economic reforms could be constructed. 
Although negotiations had been abandoned with the MNLF and attempts to woo 
the MILF had been unsuccessful, it was during President Aquino’s regime that 
the culture of peace was promoted.316 
C. THE RAMOS PERIOD (1992 – 1998) 
Ramos had been the Chief, Philippine Constabulary under martial law, but 
was one of the leaders of the military uprising, which ousted his cousin Ferdinand 
Marcos in 1986. He served under the Aquino government, first as head of the 
armed forces and then as Defense secretary, and played a significant role in 
suppressing the coup attempts. In resolving the country’s insurgency problem, 
the Ramos government basically pursued the combined strategy of a political 
settlement approach with a military approach. Under both the Aquino and Ramos 
administrations, the Marcos military strategy has been tempered by greater 
emphasis on political and diplomatic approaches.317 
Ramos had a clear vision and program of government, which aimed to 
establish political and economic stability. Under the campaign called “Philippine 
2000,” the program was envisioned to turn the Philippines into a “Newly-
Industrialized Country” and to enable the country to catch up to its more 
prosperous Asian neighbors. The inflow of foreign investment became the 
keystone of Philippine 2000 which essentially required peace. Therefore, a key 
part of Ramos’ political strategy was to negotiate with the communists, the  
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military rebels and the Moro insurgents. Without peace and security, the success 
of the government reforms would be uncertain. For the Ramos government, 
peace negotiations were a vital component of a wider agenda.  
In foreign affairs, the Ramos administration stressed political and 
economic co-operation in the South East Asian region, principally through the 
Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN). This included enhancing 
friendly relations with President Suharto of Indonesia. Correspondingly, Ramos 
reciprocated Indonesia’s good offices, in helping to negotiate a peace agreement 
with the MNLF, by supporting Indonesia over East Timor. 
After more than two decades of war, on 2 September 1996, the Philippine 
Government and the Moro National Liberation Front signed the historic Peace 
Agreement. The Philippine officials revealed that the government had spent US 
$2.78 billion during the last 26 years in the conflict with the Moros. It also stated 
that of the 100,000 recorded casualties, half were Moro while the government 
accounted for 30% and innocent civilians the remaining 20%.318 
Indonesian President Suharto and members of the OIC were instrumental 
in the mediation during the three years of negotiations. External pressure from 
the OIC played a vital role in the compromise position of Nur Misuari. Although 
the OIC had been very supportive of the Moro cause, it decided on a settlement 
with the Philippine government. Upon the signing the peace accord, Suharto and 
Malaysian promised support to their “Muslim brethren in Mindanao.”319 
The 1996 Peace Agreement provided for two phases of implementation of 
autonomy. The first phase (1996-1999), a three-year transitional period, created 
a temporary administrative body, the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD), to be followed by the establishment of a new Regional 
Autonomous Government that would operate from September 1999. The 
coverage included the fourteen provinces and the nine cities that comprise the 
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so-called Special Zone of Peace and Development or SZOPAD.320 The SPCPD 
was an interim organization to implement the peace agreement and it was 
directly under the office of the president. The specific functions of this body were 
to promote, coordinate and monitor development efforts in SZOPAD. It 
maintained an advisory body and Consultative Assembly (CA).  
The final outlines would be a new Regional Autonomous Government that 
would replace the ARMM and the SPCPD through a plebiscite within the 
SZOPAD which would be decided by the inhabitants of the provinces and cities 
of the SZOPAD. Also provided under the agreement was the creation of the 
security forces and the insertion of an Islamic curriculum in the educational 
system by integrating the Islamic schools (madrasah) into the system. Likewise, 
the regional government was empowered to establish a Shari’ah court.321 
On 11 September 1996, with government support, Nur Misuari ran 
unopposed and was elected governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao. The MNLF Chairman was likewise designated as chairman of the 
SPCPD and presiding officer of the SZOPAD and the CA. It was believed that 
placing Misuari in both positions, the peace settlement would gain wide 
acceptance among the Moros and demonstrate to the non-Muslim community 
that autonomy would benefit all groups. Moreover, Misuari’s designation is 
expected to attract financial support from the economic powerhouse of ASEAN 
countries and the Muslim world.  
Meanwhile, six MNLF leaders were elected to the Regional Legislative 
Assembly. The creation of the two bodies and the victory of the MNLF in the 
recent election paved the way for the absorption of MNLF top commanders and 
cadres into positions of power and influence in government bureaucracies and 
offices both in the SPCPD and ARMM.  
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Similarly, the MNLF ex-rebels were integrated into the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. A total of 5,200 MNLF 
elements have been integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines322 while 
1,250 members have been absorbed in the Philippine National Police.323 
The MILF and Abu Sayyaf did not sign the agreement and continued 
violent engagements with the government. MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat 
lamented that the Ramos-Misuari agreement did not address the Mindanao 
Muslims’ demand for self rule and considered the accord an outright violation of 
the Tripoli agreement. Rejecting the peace accord, the MILF vowed to continue 
the battle for “genuine Muslim Autonomy.” Similarly, Abu Sayyaf denounced 
Misuari as a traitor and declared his pursuit in the struggle for an Islamic State. 
The majority of Christians are not comfortable with the accord, mounting a 
number of public condemnations against it to demonstrate their opposition to any 
compromise with the Muslims. 
The Ramos administration pursued negotiations with the MILF and 
exploratory talks were arranged in 1997. The MILF panel emphasized a political 
and lasting solution to the conflict and underscored nine broad issues concerning 
those of ancestral domain, displaced and landless Bangsamoro, destruction of 
properties and war victims, human rights issues, social and cultural 
discrimination, corruption of the mind and moral fiber, economic inequities and 
widespread poverty, exploitation of natural resources, and agrarian related 
issues.324 Similarly, the MILF clamored for government recognition of its camps, 
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that the Philippine military withdraw from these areas325 and the Philippine 
government agreed to recognize some of the camps as “zones of peace and 
development.”326 
Clashes between the MILF and the government forces had continued as 
well as heavy violent clashes amidst the peace talks. Nevertheless, on July 1997, 
a cessation of hostilities was forged between the two warring parties but the 
ceasefire was marred by several violations on both sides. At this time, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front had become the biggest threat to national security.327  
Another major security concern of the Ramos government is the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG). The group was founded by Abdurazzak Abubakar 
Janjalani, a Tausug who participated as a mujahideen in the Afghan war in the 
late 1980s.328 The Abu Sayyaf split from the MNLF in 1991 and aimed for an 
independent Islamic state and to propagate Islam through a jihad in Mindanao 
and the Sulu islands. The United States has included the ASG in its list of foreign 
terrorist organizations, and it has been linked with Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda 
network. Philippine authorities believed that the ASG has connections with Ramzi 
Ahmed Yousef who is on trial in New York in connection with the World Trade 
Center bombing in 1993.329 
The Philippines Department of National Defense report indicated that in 
1995 the estimated membership of the ASG was about 620 rebels.330 Many 
joined the rebel group because of its success in obtaining ransoms from a round 
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of kidnappings. The level of mass support is linked to their success in obtaining 
ransoms from kidnapping rather than their demand for self-determination.331  
From 1991-1995, military authorities reported that the Abu Sayyaf 
conducted 102 terrorist activities and that the group had 11 sanctuaries.332 In 
December 1993, the ASG bombed the Davao Cathedral that killed eight people, 
with scores wounded. In June 1994, the group ambushed a bus in Basilan and 
17 were killed and 43 people were taken hostage. The ASG was linked in the 
assassination plot against Pope John Paul II in Manila on January 1995. 
Similarly, on 4 April 1995, it staged large scale actions by raiding the Christian 
village in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, leaving 72 killed and taking 37 hostages.333 
The ASG has also been involved in kidnapping tourists causing embarrassment 
to the Philippines and adversely affecting the tourism industry of the country. 
The Philippine government tried to destroy the ASG with brute military 
force employing howitzers, helicopter gunships or whatever available means that 
could be used. So far, this technique has led to an enormous destruction of 
property and loss of innocent lives. The ASG has been very elusive because they 
could cross the islands from coast to coast limitless times and unhampered. 
Likewise, having mass followings, they could avail themselves of shelter, food, 
ammunition, transportations, etc. whenever and wherever needed.334 In the later 
years, the AFP employed Special Forces to fight the group. 
The tenure of President Fidel Ramos saw economic recovery and a 
steady improvement in security conditions. It also set up a number of institutions 
to put its “comprehensive peace program” into practice. It signed a Peace 
Agreement with the MNLF and brought the MILF to the negotiation table. 
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Noticeably, the ASG stayed calm after the 1996 signing of the peace accord and 
took a respite from their terrorist activities, apparently in “deference to the 
MNLF.”335 
D. THE ESTRADA PERIOD (1998 – 2001) 
In the May 1998 elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a former actor, was 
elected as the next President of the Philippines by a remarkable majority vote. 
Estrada intended to continue the Ramos peace program, and has retained some 
of the relevant key officials of the previous administration. At the onset of Estrada 
administration, an “agreement of intent” was signed with the MILF which 
embodied both parties’ commitment “to pursue talks on the substantive issues of 
the Mindanao conflict as soon as possible.”336 However, it was only in October 
1999 that the formal peace talks were opened. The aims of the talks were to 
return the MILF to the mainstream of society, attain lasting peace in the region 
through a meaningful autonomy program, and a consolidation of the peace effort. 
The negotiations were derailed because of the tough demands of the MILF. 
Similarly, while the Philippine government had agreed to recognize the presence 
of MILF camps, the area and demarcation were supposed to be verified by the 
government.337  
During this time, violent engagements between the Philippine military and 
MILF continued to develop. On 10 January 2000, the Moro rebels occupied the 
Talayaan Municipal Hall in Maguindanao and likewise, on 16 March 2000 the 
MILF occupied the Kauswagan Town Hall in Lanao del Norte. In response, the 
government continued limited military operations to prevent MILF expansion of 
their declared territory and deny the insurgent occupation of government political 
units. 
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Confronted with increasing militancy as well as the demand in 2000 for an 
UN-supervised referendum for an independent state and the failure to achieve 
concessions towards peaceful resolution of the conflict, President Estrada 
eventually declared an “all-out-war.”338 Similarly, it is believed the government’s 
decision to seize the camps was a way to fix its mistake of recognizing the 
camps.339 The Philippine government could not accept the challenge to its 
sovereignty.  
On July 2000, the AFP overran 50 MILF camps including the Bushra and 
Abubakar. The military offensive represented a significant setback to the rebel 
group and a large number surrendered to the government. However, contrary to 
expectations, the MILF did not fight in positional warfare to defend the camps, 
but abandoned the area and disbanded into small groups of guerillas and 
dispersed to the countryside.340 The MILF organized and conducted a counter 
attack in several areas. Hashim Salamat, who took refuge in Malaysia, called on 
the Moro people to rise in a jihad.341  
The military offensive against the MILF exacted a heavy toll on the 
personnel and resources of the government as well as on the inhabitants of the 
areas directly affected. During the campaign, about 200 soldiers were killed. 
Financially, the war was a heavy burden on the government. The cost of the 
operation is estimated to be US $20 million with daily expenses from US 
$200,000 to US $400,000.342  
The instability in Mindanao has seriously affected the economy and 
adversely impacted foreign investment. The tourism industry has significantly 
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declined as has the Philippine currency.343 The stock market has suffered bitterly 
as some investors lost confidence and pulled out their ventures not only in the 
Southern Philippines but from the rest of the country. Losses in agriculture were 
significant and the Department of Agriculture predicted that the country’s food 
supply will be seriously affected if the violent confrontation continues.344  
While the military offensive was continuing, the Abu Sayyaf attracted 
publicity following the taking of hostages in Basilan Island. In March 2000, 53 
people, including a priest, several teachers, and students were taken hostage 
and ransoms demanded. On 20 April, the birthday of President Estrada, the 
bandits beheaded two male hostages as a sinister gift to the president. On 22 
April, the military started to attack the Abu Sayyaf mountain stronghold using 
artillery fire, while helicopter gunships unleashed rockets. On April 24, the military 
reported that at least 17 Abu Sayyaf rebels were killed as government troops 
continued ground and air assaults.345 The government forces conducted pursuit 
operations against the bandits who took some hostages during their retreat.  
At the time the Basilan hostage drama was still in full swing, another group 
of Abu Sayyaf abducted 21 people,  including three Germans, two French 
nationals, two South Africans, two Finns, a Lebanese woman, and two Filipino 
and nine Malaysian resort workers, from the Malaysian town of Sipadan, and 
they were then moved to Sulu.346 The hostages were released after the 
negotiations of the Libyan envoy Rajab Azzarouq. He secured the release of 17 
hostages upon paying US $25 million. A chartered plane arrived to take the 
hostages to Libya.347  
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The taking of hostages by the extremist group continued to force 
President Estrada to declare a full military attack on the Abu Sayyaf. The Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) launched an assault on the Island of Jolo on 17 
September 2000 to rescue the remaining hostages and destroy the Abu Sayyaf. 
The military operations yielded 17 hostages rescued and killed more than 100 
Abu Sayyaf and forced several members to surrender.348 
As a result of the military campaign in Mindanao declared by President 
Estrada, intense clashes between the AFP and the MILF and ASG prompted a 
massive displacement of people near the disputed areas. An estimated 40,000 
families of more than 700,000 individuals have been forced to flee their homes 
and another 40,000 persons became refugees during the initial weeks of the 
operation against the ASG.349 The damage to properties is equally high and the 
amounts for relief and rehabilitation totaled PhP1.323 billion.350 By August 2000, 
municipal halls, mosques, school buildings, roads, and bridges were damaged; 
and at least 5,000 houses were destroyed.  
Nonetheless, after the intensified warfare against the MILF, President 
Estrada issued a four-point approach on the Moro problem and pledged that the 
government would vigorously pursue reconstruction and socio-economic 
development. The President established the Presidential Task Force for Relief 
and Rehabilitation of Central Mindanao (PETFRRCM) with the mandate to ”focus 
on `quick-win' programs to respond to the more immediate needs of the 
community and to regain the confidence of the community.” The President 
promised to “win the hearts and minds” of the victims of his “all-out war policy” 
through his relief and rehabilitation program and money released to the TF 
totaled P150 million before it was turned over to the new administration.351 
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The President also approved the National Peace and Development Plan 
which contained the Strategy of Total Approach (STA). The plan covered various 
policies and programs that would address the various components- political, 
socio-economic and security - of the insurgency problem. President Estrada 
issued Executive Order 261 creating the Mindanao Coordinating Council (MCC). 
Chaired by the President with the Executive Secretary as Vice-Chairman, the 
MCC was the overall coordinating body to synchronize the implementation of all 
plans and programs in Mindanao.  
In the last quarter of year 2000, the Estrada administration was busy 
defending the president from plunder charges. He was forced to resign following 
massive demonstrations on 20 January 2001, after first being impeached by the 
House of Representatives. He was accused of charges largely concerned with 
allegations that he had accepted millions of dollars in bribes from illegal gambling 
operations and tobacco tax kickbacks.352  
E. THE MACAPAGAL PERIOD (2001 – TO DATE)  
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed power after massive protests 
and the stunning resignations of top officials forcing President Joseph Estrada 
from office. After the chaos and corruption of Joseph Estrada's period in office, 
President Arroyo was faced with the task of restoring the nation's credibility after 
the Estrada era. Immediately after assuming office, the current administration 
called for a ceasefire and peace talks, and signed a ceasefire agreement with the 
MILF in August 2001. The MILF had agreed to put aside its demands for 
independence in order to achieve progress on the rehabilitation of war-ravaged 
areas, the implementation of previous agreements forged by the MILF and 
government, and economic development for Mindanao.353  
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Vowing “restoration over devastation,” On 27 February 2001, President 
Arroyo created the Interagency Committee for Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development of Areas Affected by Armed Conflicts in Mindanao” (Interact-
Mindanao) to coordinate, integrate and implement the overall relief, rehabilitation 
and community-based development efforts for areas affected by armed conflicts 
in Mindanao. 
In a twist of development, Nur Misuari, head of the MNLF and Governor of 
ARMM, and some of his group, reverted to armed struggle. Due to political 
differences and incompetence, some MNLF leaders formed the Executive 
Council of 15 and stripped Nur Misuari of the chairmanship of the MNLF. 
Apparently, the Council of 15 is supported by Libya, Indonesia and Malaysia. On 
4 August 2001, the MILF and the Council of 15 met in Malaysia and forged a 
unity agreement. It was agreed also that they will organize the Bangsamoro 
Solidarity Conference that will serve as the venue to discuss the concerns of the 
Bangsamoro people.354 
The ARMM Governor has been critical of the plebiscite which will amend 
the ARMM Organic Act. Misuari was adamant because this political exercise will 
trigger an election in which his position is at stake. Some MNLF members argue 
that the government failed to include them in drafting the law and that it 
contravened the 1996 Peace Agreement. In 04 August 2001, the referendum 
proceeded as planned and it resulted in the expansion of the ARMM to include 
the Basilan Province and Marawi City aside from the former members of Sulu, 
Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. Consequently, Misuari decided not 
to participate in the November 2001 election claiming that the process was a 
betrayal of the government’s commitment to the peace accord.  
Misuari declared war on the Arroyo government on 19 November 2001 
and his loyal followers attacked the Army Brigade headquarters in Jolo, Sulu that 
, most of whom were his men. When this failed, he left about 100 people dead
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fled but was arrested by the Malaysian authorities for illegally entering the 
country. The attack was apparently intended to disrupt and discredit the 
forthcoming elections scheduled on 26 November, which would have replaced 
him as ARMM governor.  
Nur Misuari was detained on charges of rebellion and if found guilty, he 
could face up to 20 years imprisonment. Administrative cases also had been 
leveled against him for being an inept leader of the ARMM. It is believed that 
even though the national government allocated about Php43 billions for the 
ARMM, , the region is still impoverished after five years. No significant project 
was developed during his term and it was reported that Misuari misused funds 
intended for the poverty alleviation program, and about PhP40 millions were 
diverted to procure high-powered weapons.355 The Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir was one of those Islamic leaders disenchanted with Misuari. He said,  
Autonomy has been accorded but unfortunately, when in power, 
they did not use their power for the development of the southern 
Philippines … Not much has been done for the benefit of the 
people. So therefore, we no longer feel responsible to provide him 
with any assistance.356 
The election was successfully conducted with 70% turnout with few 
incidences of violence. Dr. Parouk Hussin, Presidential Adviser for Muslim 
Mindanao Concerns and a member of the Executive Committee of 15, won the 
election. In reference to Misuari’s abuse of power and misuse of both 
government funds and economic assistance from oil-rich Islamic nations, Hussin 
said, “I assure you I am armed with seriousness, dedication and determination to 
develop this poor region.” He further pledged to support the government’s peace 
effort with the MNLF breakaway group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.357 
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The disastrous experience of Nur Misuari consolidated the MILF’s 
leadership of the Moro secessionist movement. Misuari’s failure to ameliorate the 
living conditions and improve the economic conditions of the ARMM seriously 
damaged Moro confidence in the current autonomy and stirred up the rise of the 
Islamic fundamentalist movement led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.358 
Abuza describes the MILF as quite confident in their current position. First, 
the rebel group has not been defeated on the battlefield and currently holds 
about 12,000 to 15,000 armed elements. Second, the MILF is gathering the 
support of most Muslims because of the dissatisfaction from the failure of the 
MNLF leadership to deliver the reforms. Third, it is successfully working through 
the political system and is confident of its popular support. Fourth, the MILF is 
satisfied with the growing trend toward a more Islamic consciousness of the 
people.359 
During 2002, some positive developments occurred such as the signing in 
May of implementing the guidelines of the peace agreement between the two 
parties and the return of almost all those displaced by the 2000 conflict. On 7 
May, the two sides signed the “Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, 
Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on 
Peace of 2001 in Putrajaya, Malaysia. The first two provisions of the joint 
communiqué specified that first, the Philippine government and the MILF agree 
to isolate and interdict “all criminal elements and kidnap-for-ransom groups 
including the so-called ‘Lost Commands’ operating in Mindanao”, and second 
both sides agree “that the activities of these criminal groups impede the peace 
process, the effective pursuit of development programs and the efficient delivery 
of basic services to the poor”, and “for this purpose immediate and joint action is 
needed for the security and upliftment of the affected communities.” 
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The ceasefire between the MILF and the AFP has been marked with 
violations and there were reports that the insurgents were sheltering members of 
the Pentagon gang, a group on the U.S. terrorist list.360 On 12 February 2003, 
President Arroyo ordered the resumption of military actions against the Moro 
rebels after the MILF negotiating panel failed to meet the government 
negotiators. Also, the Philippine government was incensed about the continuous 
cuddling and protection of kidnappers by the MILF. The rebels conducted various 
forms of retaliation, took people hostage, attacked government installations and 
torched houses.361 On 6 May, President Arroyo suspended the informal peace 
talks with the 12,500-strong MILF after a series of raids and bombings of civilian 
targets. 
After successful military operations, in May 2003, the MILF declared a 10-
day unilateral ceasefire, which was later extended, with the hope of stopping the 
military campaign. The government did not jump at the truce calling it a “token 
gesture and just for show only and, perhaps, it is just their strategy to reduce 
pressure on the MILF” and intended for the consumption of the OIC.362  
On 23 June 2003, Hashim Salamat, the MILF chief, renounced terrorism, 
a key government condition for resuming long-stalled peace talks. He said, “To 
stress seriously this point, I hereby reiterate our condemnation and abhorrence of 
terrorist tendencies.” Salamat added that terrorism is anathema to the teachings 
of Islam.363 The MILF denied links to Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network or the 
Southeast Asian militant Islamic group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It was reported 
that camps in an area controlled by the MILF had been used as training centers 
for the JI. 
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A month later, President Arroyo signed a ceasefire agreement with the 
MILF paving the way for formal peace negotiations in Malaysia. She said, “As we 
address the roots of rebellion and secession, I am confident that we shall also 
effectively isolate and marginalize the dwindling terrorist cells in Mindanao and 
across our seas in the region.” The authorities agreed to the MILF’s demand that 
arrest warrants be dropped against their leaders allegedly involved in the recent 
deadly bombings in Mindanao.  
Meanwhile, the United States accused the separatist group of ties with the 
regional terror JI and threatened millions in aid unless the MILF stops harboring 
“outlaws” and “terrorists.” Al Haj Murad, who replaced Salamat as MILF 
chairman, said he met with self-confessed Jemaah Islamiyah Fathur Roman al-
Ghozi during the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He said after the 
war ended, Al-Ghozi visited the MILF camp but was refused . Also, Taufik Refke 
an alleged leader of the Indonesia-based JI, reported that the MILF had been 
providing JI terrorists in Mindanao safe houses and facilities.364 
Aside from the impending formal negotiations with the MILF in Malaysia, 
President Arroyo’s administration has successfully won the support of the United 
Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United States for the 
peace process. The World Bank, US Assistance for International Development 
and Muslim countries, was arranging a multi-donor trust fund for the Southern 
Philippines.365 President George Bush said during the state visit in the 
Philippines on October 2003 that the United States would extend up to $30 
million in development aid for livelihood enhancement, basic infrastructure and 
education to the Southern Philippines once a peace treaty is signed.366 
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The Abu Sayyaf has continuously troubled the Arroyo Administration and 
has been a major security and peace and order concern in Western Mindanao. 
The bandit group persistently engaged in kidnappings and the taking of civilian 
hostages and virtually turned these criminal activities into a lucrative million-dollar 
“cottage industry.” In May 2001, the bandits struck again, taking 20 more 
hostages, including three Americans, Martin and Garcia Burnham, and Guillermo 
Sobero. The two male Americans and four Filipinos were freed. In June 2001, the 
Abu Sayyaf had accumulated a total of 102 hostages including three Americans. 
Showing their ruthlessness, the Abu Sayyaf beheaded 18 of the captives, and 
one was the American tourist Guillermo Sobero.367 
The government has launched a massive military campaign against the 
Abu Sayyaf with little success. The Philippine authorities recognized the 
deficiencies in terms of equipment and particularly the lack of the ability to 
conduct nighttime operations. Accordingly, the priority for weapons and 
equipment acquisition are night-vision goggles, thermal imagers, and helicopters 
with night-flying capabilities.368 
President Arroyo lends a robust response to counter-terrorism. She is the 
First Asian leader to support the American “war on terrorism” and vowed to make 
all efforts needed to implement the UN Security Council resolution 1368. 
Immediately after September 11, the Arroyo administration announced the 
“Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action of the Government Against Terrorism,” to 
strengthen internal measures against terrorism, modernization of the security 
forces, enlistment of the cooperation of the other sectors of the society such as 
the media, and addressing the root causes of terrorism. The Philippine 
government offered Philippine airspace and seaports to U.S. forces. Moreover, 
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 the Philippines allowed the deployment of about 1,300 U.S. military forces, 
including 160 Special Forces to assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the 
fight against the Abu Sayyaf.369  
In January 2002, the approximately 660-strong U.S. forces were deployed 
in Western Philippines to train Philippine troops and to provide operational 
support, including intelligence and air support. However, the American troops 
were forbidden to directly participate in combat operations, but could join the 
frontline units and fight back in self-defense. U.S. forces flew helicopters and the 
Navy P-3 Orion, while the Special Forces deployed ground sensors. Part of the 
U.S. involvement was the deployment of 280 military engineers to do civil works. 
Furthermore, U.S. Special Forces trained light reaction companies and provided 
equipment for counter-terrorism operations.370 
During Presidents Arroyo’s visit to the United States in December 2003, 
President Bush announced a military package worth $137 million. Following her 
visit in May 2003, the Bush administration extended significant military and 
financial assistance which included $95 million in military aid, tariff reductions, 
and expanded veterans benefits.371 
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VI. CONCLUSION – CAUSES AND PROSPECT 
The roots of the Moro resistance are historically linked to the ethno-
religious separateness of the Muslim Filipinos. The Mindanao conflict is highly 
complex and its origin is a combination of several variables which include socio-
economic deprivation, political marginalization, and the challenge of the minority 
over the oppressive majority, government ineptitude and corruption, and foreign 
intervention. 
The politicization of the Muslim identity as a separate nation is a more 
pervasive factor of the conflict. The colonial aggression, first by the Spaniards 
then Americans, is a significant variable of the Muslim restlessness. Spain tried 
to subjugate the Moros through sword and cross but the Moros vigorously fought 
the Spaniards for three centuries. The American colonial administration 
succeeded in pacifying the region and pursued a policy of attraction and the 
integration of the Moros in the body politics of the Filipino nation. Under Filipino 
administrators, Christian Filipinos were encouraged to settle in Mindanao and 
received development support from the government. A government study done in 
1955 attributed the Moro revolt to an alleged feeling that they did not feel part of 
the nation as a whole.  
Muslim grievances over land distribution and the lack of political 
representation were the result of colonial era policies and strategies of 
integration. Land issues have been the most fundamental Muslim concern and 
important factor fueling the conflict. Private property, as understood by the 
Christians, does not exist in the minds of the Moro lower class as a rule. The 
Muslim thinks of land as belonging to clan while to the Christian it is a matter of 
individual ownership.372 Differences in the concept of land ownership are a factor 
leading to conflict. 
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The quintessence of political awareness towards separatism is the rise of 
ethnocentric nationalism, where an ethnic group is attracted to the goal of 
autonomy or outright independence. Historical experience is a component of the 
Muslim’s conscious need to chart their destiny. Moro autonomy is not only to 
satisfy their demand for the promotion of a cultural and religious identity but also 
an effort to change the calculus of power.  
Finding a common cause, the Muslims became politicized and began to 
organize. In 1968, the insurgents formed the Muslim Independence Movement 
(MIM) and later a more radical organization, the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), achieved prominence and command. The MNLF’s goal was to establish 
an independent state, protect Muslim practices and culture, and result in an end 
to subjugation and the return of the lands taken away by Christians.373 Although 
the battle cry is along ethnic and religious lines, the clear motive was socio- 
economic deprivations.  
In 1996, the MNLF and the Government signed what was hoped to be  
“the final peace agreement.” The key of the peace accord was the creation of the 
autonomous region in Mindanao with the expectation that such a political 
settlement would draw and be able to win the confidence of the great majority of 
the Moros who are still fighting for independence. The peace process was 
supported by the international community, particularly the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, which poured in financial resources for the development of 
the region. Many MNLF entered civilian politics and some of their members were 
integrated into the Philippine security forces. The MILF and the Abu Sayyaf have 
opposed this peace arrangement. 
Nur Misuari, Chairman of the MNLF, became the governor of the 
Autonomous Region of Mindanao (ARMM) and before his term ended in 
November 2001; he was ousted as the MNLF chief. After a brief revolt, Misuari 
was removed from office and was detained for treason. The ARMM is failing to 
produce the expected benefits of improving the standard of living of the Muslims. 
                                            
373 Quimpo, 44. 
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This is primarily due to mismanagement and corruption of their regional leaders. 
Meanwhile, the widespread socio-economic difficulties, and the unstable peace 
and order situation continue to plague the region. The ARMM has remained the 
poorest region and has the highest infant mortality rate of 64% and the lowest 
functional literacy of 60% compared to the rest of the country.374 
The peace accord failed to win the Moro rebels who have been fighting for 
secession. As a result, the 12,500 MILF rebel group resumed the violent struggle 
while the extremists have gone rampaging, kidnapping both foreigners and 
Christians for ransom. Despite the renewed military campaign of the government 
against the separatist group, the violent disputes and the idea of secessionism 
persist. 
Today, the Philippine government and the Moro separatist rebels are 
locked in war. Neither side is willing to recapitulate to their respective demands. 
The former is asserting national sovereignty and territorial integrity while the 
latter is invoking self-determination. The road to peace remains elusive and 
Mindanao experiences a trauma of conflict entrapment. However, to avert further 
escalation and settle the conflict, both parties should be willing to return to the 
negotiating table and should call for a cessation of hostilities. A third party should 
be designated to monitor an agreed truce. Both parties apparently consider the 
Malaysians and Indonesians capable of assuming the role of peacekeepers.   
Initially, the government could restore the people’s confidence in the 
ARMM through the establishment of strong and effective institutions around the 
regional government. Priority programs should be towards good governance by 
enhancing the functional capacity of the ARMM and strengthening social 
cohesiveness.375 The commitment of resources for the alleviation of poverty 
would be a firm demonstration of the government’s genuine commitment to 
redress the economic flight of the Moros.  
                                            
374 Jose T. Pardo, Addressing the Root Causes of the Mindanao Problem (presentation), Rebuilding 
Mindanao Mindanao Common-Ground for Peace and Development (concept paper), 2000. 
375 Milner F. De la Cruz, “Addressing the MILF Challenge of Secessionism,” OSS Digest, 1st and 2nd 
Quarter, 43.   
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The creation of a separate Muslim state is unlikely because it lacks 
support by the international community including the countries from the 
Organization of Islamic Conference. The MILF has to put aside demands for 
independence and should accept any offer of genuine autonomy. Some sectors 
of the society have offered alternative solutions towards greater autonomy by 
supporting the idea of a federalist governance structure as “the ultimate solution 
to the peace process in Mindanao.”  They argue for a federal system under which 
the ARMM could accommodate their aspirations to practice Islamic law. 
Federalism would entail constitutional amendments and the only substantive 
progress so far on this subject is debates.  
The Organization of Islamic Conference could play a vital role in the 
negotiations considering that it brokered the 1976 and the 1996 GRP-MNLF 
peace agreements. Also, in Bertrand’s opinion, one of the flaws in the previous 
negotiation process was the failure to involve the non-Muslims in the peace talks. 
Consequently, the participation of the Christians and Lumad in peace 
negotiations should be encouraged to generate broad-based support. 
The United States should continue to assume a major role in the 
negotiations because of its historical links to the Southern Philippines. The Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front’s leadership welcomes American participation in the 
peace process. President Bush has committed US $30 million for the 
development of Mindanao should the peace agreement be forged between the 
two countries. On the war against terrorism, the Philippine military will continue to 
receive substantial aid in terms of equipment and training. 
In the meantime, the government should endeavor to strengthen the 
ARMM as a viable political institution in the region. The national agencies, local 
governments and non-government organizations working in the region should 
integrate their efforts towards the efficient delivery of services and prevent violent 
conflict. Short term and doable goals aimed at alleviating poverty should be done 
to gain confidence. Moreover, making autonomy work will require the 
commitment of adequate resources from the national government.  
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Finally, unless the MILF and the Philippine government overcome their 
differences and agree on a compromise political settlement, the Moro problem 
will persist. Moro nationalism will likely survive but the external and internal 
factors will dictate the level of struggle. Policy makers and negotiators should 
recognize the Moro grievances in terms of ethnic, religious and nationalist factors 
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